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The state of the economics discipline has been in crisis for decades, and the 
shortcomings of mainstream economic theorizing brought to general attention.  
However, orthodox policy advice still dominates in policy-making arenas, and heterodox 
economists are too readily dismissed in an age that can properly be called the return 
of “vulgar economics.” It will be argued that the heterodox “challenge” to the current 
economic climate must be two-pronged, involving both a sound critique of mainstream 
economics in terms of internal consistency and empirical evaluation of policy 
outcomes, and offer a clear, cogent foundation from which a multitude of political 
viewpoints and heterodox theories can proceed. This dissertation first takes up the latter 
charge by pointing to one such broadly unifying foundation already evident in much of 
the heterodox literature, specifically in the Marxist and Veblenian Institutionalist schools 
of thought. Once clarified, this dissertation then begins the work of the first task by 
critically examining orthodox economic theory, particularly in development policy-
making and advice. Finally, a call is made for recognition of commonality already 
underpinning the various heterodox views of economic life. It is suggested that future 
research incorporates the Institutionalism – as outlined here – into the Classical-
Keynesian framework, so that it is firmly rooted within an existing theoretical structure 
capable of encompassing differing particular economic viewpoints. It is argued that this 
would bring into clear focus the heterodox position that sees the study of power 





























This dissertation is dedicated to Matias, my professor and mentor; my sister, Miriam, 
and “sister- from-another-mother,” Rachel; and my husband, Richard, whose support, 
encouragement, and unwavering patience as I pursued this degree and through 
lengthy and unprompted monologues on the essential nature of everything has surely 
guaranteed him sainthood. 
	  













ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... vii  
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 
      References .................................................................................................................... 11 
 
INSTITUTIONALISM: A MARXIST-VEBLENAIN BASIS ........................................ 12 
      Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 12 
      Introduction ................................................................................................................. 12 
      Radical Institutionalism  .............................................................................................. 16 
      Marx’s Process ............................................................................................................ 19 
      Veblen’s Process ......................................................................................................... 26 
      Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 32 
      References .................................................................................................................... 33 
	  
THE VEBLENIAN ROOTS OF INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ............. 36 
	  
      Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 36 
      Introduction ................................................................................................................. 36 
      The Economics of Thorstein Veblen ........................................................................... 38 
      New Institutional Economics ...................................................................................... 47 
      Ha-Joon Chang’s Institutional Political Economy ..................................................... 54 
      Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 62 
      References ................................................................................................................... 64 
 
THE CAPITAL DEBATES AND MAINSTREAM POLICY ADVICE: A CASE 
STUDY .............................................................................................................................. 67 
	  
      Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 67 
      Introduction ................................................................................................................. 67 
      The Return of Vulgar Economics ................................................................................ 70 
      Do the Same, but Expect Different Results ................................................................. 76 




      Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 86 
 











It is with immense gratitude that I thank first, and foremost, my advisor, Matias 
Vernengo, for his guidance, patient mentorship, and contagious passion for research. His 
brilliance and scholarship are matched only by his genuinely good nature and humor. It 
is an honor to share the credit of my work with him. 
I am indebted to my colleague and coauthor, William McColloch, with whom I 
published a version of this dissertation’s first essay. Our discussions on Marx and Veblen 
were invaluable. 
I would also like to thank Al Campbell for instruction that helped form my 
theoretical foundations and unmatched enthusiasm for change that motivated me to take 
my esoteric philosophy to policy and practice. I also want to express my deepest 
gratitude to Jane D’Arista, who became a role model of scholarship and collegiality 
early in my doctoral studies. Their exemplary work, support, and encouragement  
provided much needed light in some of the doctoral and dissertation fog that helped guide 
me to the completion of this project. 
Additionally, it is with pleasure that I acknowledge the support of E.K. Hunt for 
his inspiring instruction and work, and John Watkins for challenging and encouraging 
me through my undergraduate and graduate degrees. 
Finally, I am grateful for support from the Howard-Karsten Graduate 
Fellowship, and The Journa  of Economic Issues, Versus Academica, and The  Journal  
	  of Philosophical Economics for permission to include portions in this dissertation 











The economics discipline has been in a state of crisis for decades. The crisis is 
perhaps most widely visible in the policy-making arena, where it has been particularly 
evident over the last decade and in the aftermath of the 2007 “Great Recession.” As any 
teacher of economics to undergraduate students can attest, explaining U.S. policy 
decisions with lucid and consistent economic models in recent decades is a formidable 
task. The neoclassical orthodoxy has been guiding policy for decades, but policy 
decisions are often inexplicable when attempting to employ their own models, much 
less with consistency to the underlying assumptions. This is where the teacher and 
scholar is left explaining political objectives, targeted loosely through mainstream 
economic models in support of these objectives in an ad hoc fashion. Consequently, 
heterodox economists are often derided and dismissed by the mainstream of the 
discipline for being overly guided by their political value systems. Even for students 
introduced to both heterodox and mainstream approaches in their undergraduate studies, 
many are left concluding, at best, that “pluralism” (appropriate economic analysis 
employs different models and approaches for different problems) is the best way to 
undertake economic analysis, and, at worst, that neoclassical economics has detached 
itself from political values, making it a “true” science, while heterodox economics has 
failed to do so. 
Economic orthodoxy enjoys the position of reflecting the status quo, giving it the 
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appearance of unbiased investigation. Leaving aside the issue of whether or not it is 
possible (or even desirable) to detach preanalytic vision entirely from academic work,1 
for those working outside the mainstream of economics this is by no means a new 
challenge, or a new topic of examination in the literature. The strength and longevity of 
this challenge through a major economic crisis only underscores how critical it is that 
this perception of heterodoxy continue to be addressed and relentlessly challenged. 
Moreover, as Bortis (1997) and various authors have pointed out, specialization and 
compartmentalization of economic theory has been rapidly increasing, such that 
economics is today “a divided science.” This poses an additional stumbling block for 
heterodox economists in that neoclassical economics is the dominant paradigm, so that 
the “specialization and diversification take place exclusively on the basis of one 
approach” (p. xii). 
This dissertation sees the heterodox challenge as a two-pronged task: (a) a clear 
critique of the dominant paradigm in terms of internal consistency and empirical 
evaluation of policy outcomes and (b) a clear, cogent foundation from which a multitude 
of political viewpoints and various heterodox theories can proceed. This dissertation first 
takes up the latter by pointing to one such broadly unifying foundation already evident 
in much of the heterodox literature. Once this approach is clarified, this dissertation then 
begins the work of the first task by critically examining the mainstream of economics, 
	  
	  
1 This follows Schumpeter’s use of the term “preanalytic vision” in History of 
Economic Analysis. As he explains,“[In] order to be able to posit to ourselves any 
problems at all, we should first have to visualize a distinct set of coherent phenomena 
as a worthwhile object of our analytic effort. In other words, analytic effort is of 
necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the 
analytic effort” (1954, p. 41). 
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particularly in the arena of development policy, concluding with a suggestion for future 
research that formally incorporates the Institutionalism outlined here into a Classical-
Keynesian framework. 
One way this dissertation proposes that heterodoxy strengthen its position 
amongst competing approaches to the study of economics, is in first recognizing an 
already existent common underlying Institutionalist vision of economic life, which it is 
argued, is most clearly expressed in the works of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen in 
the history of economic thought.2 It is reasonable to suggest that most heterodox 
economists agree that capitalism is a unique economic system, and that the primary 
premise of human history is production for the means of life, and therefore the 
production of material life itself. As such, there are certain universal qualities that all 
modes of production share (i.e., production, distribution, and exchange.) On the other 
hand, these qualities take on particular forms in each historical epoch, as for example, in 
Karl Polanyi’s rendering of economic systems that organize production and distribution 
on some combination of principles, the functioning of which is ensured by 




2 Though, of course, numerous scholars abound throughout the history of economic 
thought in the present day who have maintained, formalized, and extended this 
economic tradition brilliantly so that it corresponds to the material conditions of a more 
advanced capitalist mode of production. Although Ha-Joon Chang is explored as one 
such economist in the second essay of this dissertation, the concluding section of this 
dissertation will revisit this topic as a suggestion for a classical-Keynesian framework  
that has room for the institutional insight for a Marxist- Veblenian Institutionalism, as 
viewed in this dissertation. 
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Great Transformation.3  These particular forms are manifest in appearances – that 
which is most immediately grasped and knowable, which also contain the less visible 
universal qualities within them.  
The economist to have first clearly (however dense his presentation may 
have been) brought this into view was Marx, who revealed a dual nature of 
economic life. By activelyworking through and beyond the particular features as they 
present themselves in economic life, Marx demonstrates that it is possible to arrive at 
also the universal features of an economic system, providing a deep understanding of the 
capitalist mode of production. In taking this approach, he was able to uncover the false 
(inverted) reality capitalism conveys to human subjects, and which so confounds 
neoclassical economics. It is argued in this dissertation that Veblen takes a quite 
similar approach and seems to share this underlying vision of economic life. This view 
supports much of the Radical Institutionalist literature that aims at restoring the radical 
elements of Veblen, and demonstrates that the distinctions made in the literature 
between Marxand Veblen have been greatly overstated.4 It is hoped that this 
dissertation will contribute to the Radical Institutionalist project by pointing to a 
similarity in approach to economic investigation that suggests an underlying 
essentialism in both authors. It is proposed in this dissertation that economists simply  
call this shared vision of economic life “Institutionalism,” however ambiguous that  
 
3 See especially chapters 4-5 for a presentation of the principles and patterns. Moreover, 
chapter 6 on the fiction of the self-regulating market demonstrates an Institutional 
underpinning that complements the presentation of Institutionalism in this dissertation. 
4 As for example, in William Dugger’s words, the project is to “[R]estore the whole 
Veblen. Put the red threads back into him and turn Veblen the Eccentric into Veblen 
the Red” (Dugger, 2006, p. 261) 
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term has become, as a reclaiming of a Veblenian Institutionalism in a mass of economic 
literature that stamps this label on any work that makes mention of institutions.5 
Another reason for choosing these two authors in particular is that it is no 
mistake they have both extraordinarily and powerfully influenced the economics 
discipline in general with their respective abilities to see through the free market fiction 
and lay bare a system replete with conflict, while make hard hitting criticisms of the 
economics discipline itself. This influence is evident even in the form of polemically 
formed models and arguments in support of the marginalist exchange-based approach, 
generally referred to as neoclassical economics in this dissertation. Those economists 
who have extended the respective works of Marx and Veblen have similarly helped 
bring clarity into the economics discipline within an evolving and more advanced 
capitalist world-system. This, it is argued, is because both Marx and Veblen are 
Institutionalists, as it is defined in this dissertation, even though neither author applied 
this term to their own work. There is, unfortunately from the viewpoint of this 
dissertation, more debate and less cohesion between the disciples of these two authors 
than a first glance at the conclusions and basic understanding of capitalism in their works 
would suggest in to a student of economics. The rift between Marxist and Veblenian 
Institutionalists is certainly not the only fissure within heterodoxy, but given that most 
heterodox economists proceed from an Institutionalist framework for capitalism that it  
 
5 There is a similar ambiguity in the use of the term “Political Economy.” An 
examination of the difference between two distinct approaches to economic 
investigation that both lay claim to this term is, however, beyond the scope of the 
present work but rests largely on the same distinction made in the second essay 
between New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Old Institutional Economics (OIE). 
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is so evident in the works of these two authors, it seems sensible to begin with a 
reconciliation in this literature before extending it to other “schools” of thought. 
After making a case for a broadly reconciled Marxist-Veblenian Institutionalism, 
another way this dissertation aims to help outline a unifying vision in heterodoxy is in 
clarifying the term “Institutionalism” and examining the present state of Institutional 
economics, particularly in the field of development economics where it is most 
commonly found. It can be fairly said that the classical political economists were 
largely “development economists,”6 in the sense that they were concerned with the 
growth and reproduction of the system, generally from the viewpoint of the “surplus 
approach.”7 Since this dissertation proceeds from the viewpoint of political economy (a 
view to understanding the development and growth of capitalism, which is coexistent 
with the development of economics itself – both heterodox and orthodox), the study of 
capitalism cannot be separated from the study of institutions. The mere introduction of 
institutions into existing neoclassical models is not a sufficient means of understanding 
the way capitalism functions, and concurrently fails to function as the best allocator of 
resources. Institutions, particularly as manifested in mode of production-specific power 
	  
6 See, for example, “The Pioneers of Development Economics: Great Economists on 
Development.” In the Introduction to this 2005 collection of works Jomo K.S. states 
that “[T]he way forward for development economics…must build on the many 
heterodox economic legacies that have contributed valuable insights which 
development economics has built upon. And the enduring contributions of the early 
development economists are decidedly heterodox in nature. Hence, rather than 
encourage developments to be ‘domesticated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ by the orthodox 
mainstream, the economics of development needs to be recognized as offering a 
superior mode of economic analysis...” (KS, Jomo, 2005, p. xiii). 
	  
7 See Garegnani (1984) for a summary of the main tenets of the classical surplus 
approach, and the concluding section of this dissertation for a brief discussion of its 
compatibility with the foundational Institutionalism proposed in this dissertation 
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relations, underpin and are the contextual basis of capitalism. They are not merely 
distinct variables among the “players” of the competition for scarce resources game, or 
“obstacles” to achieving market efficiency a many so-called Institutionalist authors 
have it. The analysis of heterodox economists, like most of the great classical authors, 
proceeds from a firm grounding in a historical study of economic systems up to and 
including capitalism, necessitating an investigation of the political and legal systems of 
each epoch. In this way, heterodox economists understand institutions as critical to 
understanding the present economic system, and do not attempt to create a fictitious 
world of unfettered markets over which institutions are superimposed to see how this 
fictitious world might be provoked, for better or worse, as perceived by the practitioner. 
This clarification of the term Institutionalism contributes also to the first task of 
strengthening heterodoxy’s position in the economics discipline, as it also contains a 
critique of mainstream Institutionalist models and policy advice. 
A third way this dissertation aims to meet the challenge of bolstering heterodoxy’s 
relative position in economics is through a direct critique of neoclassical theory and 
empirical policy results over the last decades. Specifically, this dissertation hopes to 
establish what is best described in Marx’s words as the revenge of “vulgar economics.” It 
will be argued that mainstream policy over the last decades has been guided less by 
orthodox economic models and more by political objectives that accord with the 
interests of the elites. For some neoclassical practitioners this is undeniably purposeful 
– done to advance their careers and earnings. Other, well-intentioned, sharp neoclassical 
economists are simply misguided by an approach to economics that provides little by 
way of understanding the essential nature of the existing mode of production, limiting 
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their ability to effectively make policy that achieves desired and predicted results.8 As 
stated early on, this dissertation hopes to make a contribution toward a change in the 
terms of the debate heterodox economists have long been having with neoclassical 
economists.9 Part of this undertaking necessarily involves a look into the history of the 
economics discipline itself. Even though the so-called “marginalist revolution” and 
formalization of “exchange- theories”10 is undoubtedly relevant to this story, much has 
been written on this matter and is not the focus of this dissertation. Instead, capital 
debates will be made a point of focus in the history of economics that helped steer the 
orthodoxy in the direction of vulgar economics at the same time free-market fanaticism 
grew in the policy arena.11 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), an institution 
dedicated to economic policy and empirical research attuned to the mainstream of the 
profession, and one of the most powerful financial institutions in the world, is used as a  
	  
8 See the second essay in this dissertation for examples of such “Institutional” economic 
thinkers. 
	  
9 This dissertation presupposes that an uncompromising debate as heterodox 
economists, rather than acquiescence with the mainstream, is both desirable and 
necessary for the well-being of the capitalist world-system. For a discussion of this 
viewpoint in the context of Colander, Holt, and Rosser’s provocative 2007 piece, see 
Vernengo (2010). 
	  
10 This follows the terminology of Hunt and Lautzenheiser (2011) and Pasinetti 
(1977), and is used in contrast to the “production approach” of the classical authors to 
economic theorizing. 
 
11 Although it will be made clear in the second essay of this dissertation (which 
explores Veblen’s theory of institutions in more depth than the first essay), it is perhaps 
worth mentioning at this point, for clarity’s sake, that the economics discipline is itself 
an institution, in that it is an organized system of “custom and habits of thought” as 
Veblen had it. Veblen’s approach (as Marx’s) involves a two-way street, so to speak, 
between institutions and individuals, which is to say between historically inherited 
material conditions and human subjectivity within this context, generally discussed as 
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case study of the confusion the capital debates forced on neoclassical economics. This is 
of particular interest following the 2007 crisis, in which many heterodox economists 
hoped that a significant change in economic theory and policy-making may take place. 
To meet these goals, the remainder of this dissertation is organized into three 
essays, followed by concluding remarks. The first of these essays,  “Institutionalism: A 
Marxist- Veblenian Basis,” maintains that as the Radical Institutionalist literature attests, 
in spite of methodological differences, Marx and Veblen draw strikingly similar 
conclusions regarding production, conflict, and alienation in modern life. This essay 
attempts to add a new dimension to this viewpoint by establishing that similarity in 
conclusion stems from similarity in approach. After briefly reviewing some of the 
Radical Institutionalist literature, Marx’s method is examined, making the mediated 
starting point the focal point of examination. Veblen’s own approach to analysis in The 
Theory of Business Enterprise, and the conclusions that emerge as they resemble those of 
Marx, will then be presented. It is concluded in this essay that in taking a kindred 
approach, Veblen is able to arrive at an understanding of capitalism in accordance with, 
and complementary to, Marx’s rendering of the inverted nature of economic life in 
modernity. This viewpoint, it is argued, is the very basis of Institutionalism.	   
The second essay, titled “The Veblenian Roots of Institutional Political 
Economy,” looks specifically at the usage of the term “Institutional Economics,” which  
	  
	  
 “cumulative” or “recursive” causation. Consistent with this viewpoint, it is not being 
argued in this dissertation that a change in economic theory causes a direct, linear 
change on the historical development of capitalism. Rather, the capital debates are an 
important part, in tandem with the development of capitalism, toward a more 
liberalized capitalism and theory. In short, it is a two-way street between influential 
economic ideas and existing historical, material conditions. 
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has been applied to some of capitalism’s strongest critics as well as its most ardent 
apologists. In examining the roots of Institutional economics, this essay attempts to 
disentangle the ambiguity surrounding this label. The Institutional Political Economy of 
Ha-Joon Chang is then examined as a return to Institutionalism’s radical roots in 
development economics. Concluding remarks suggest that this approach is capable of 
encompassing gender as an analytical category, an extension that would improve the 
ability of policy makers to assess the impacts of macroeconomic policy. 
The third and final essay, “The Capital Debates and Mainstream Policy Advice: 
A Case Study,” is coauthored with Matias Vernengo. Here we argue that the global 
crisis of 2007 has shown the limitations of the mainstream approach. We trace the 
origins of the limitations of the dominant neoclassical views to the capital debates and to 
the rise to dominance of intertemporal general equilibrium. We use the IMF as a case 
study of this perplexing continuity of policy advice. Given our survey, we conclude 
that even though the economy was in the midst of the worst capitalist crisis since the 
Great Depression, a significant paradigmatic shift in economics is extraordinarily 
unlikely.	  	  
Concluding remarks will follow, where it will be suggested that the analysis done 
in this dissertation lays the groundwork for the introduction of Institutionalism into the 
classical- Keynesian framework, an integration that would mutually strengthen these 
compatible and complementary approaches to the study of economic life. It will be 
argued that such a synthesis has the strength and potential to be the basis for heterodox 
approaches to economic investigation and policy-making, as it leaves space open for 
historical and institutional specificity and is compatible with different theories of 
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investment, allowing debate and discussion to continue in a more productive way – with 
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INSTITUTIONALISM: A MARXIST-VEBLENIAN BASIS1 
	  
Abstract 
As the Radical Institutionalist literature attests, in spite of methodological 
differences, Marx and Veblen draw strikingly similar conclusions regarding production, 
conflict, and alienation in modern life. An attempt is made here to contribute to this 
viewpoint by establishing that similarity in conclusion stems from similarity in 
approach. Marx’s method will be briefly reviewed, making the mediated starting point 
the focus of discussion. From this vantage point, Veblen’s own approach to analysis in 
The Theory of Business Enterprise, as well as the conclusions that emerge as they 
resemble those of Marx, are considered. It is concluded that in taking a kindred 
approach Veblen is able to arrive at an understanding of capitalism in accordance with, 




For students working in the heterodox tradition of political economy, where the 
respective works of Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen form part of the canon, numerous  
	  
1 Portions of this essay have been reprinted from Journal of Economic Issues 46, no 3 
(September 2012): 757—767. Used by permission of M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All Rights 
Reserved. Not for reproduction. 
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ostensible parallels between the works of these authors present themselves. Despite this 
common intuitive supposition, even a cursory glance at the existing literature reveals 
little consensus. It would therefore be folly to think this century-long deliberation 
could be resolved here, in the context of the present paper; it is hoped merely to add 
a new dimension to the discussion. Here, it is maintained that the striking 
similarities that emerge in the analysis and conclusions of both thinkers follow from a 
commonality in method. It is not argued that methodologies of Marx and Veblen are, by 
any means, identical, or to deny distinctions between the two, but it is insisted, in 
line with the Radical Institutionalist literature, that the rift between them has been 
greatly overstated. Specifically, it is argued that a parallel can be drawn between Marx 
and Veblen in terms of their chosen starting points; a parallel only reinforced by their 
shared perception of the nature of economic life. Of course, the contention that one's 
point of departure influences the content of a work is a simple truism that would 
scarcely require proof. The objective here is to demonstrate that Veblen's chosen starting 
point in The Theory of Business Enterprise reveals a great deal about his essential 
methodology, much as Marx's choice to begin Capital with the simple commodity form 
is far from an arbitrary point of entry. Just as Marx's method served to demystify 
capitalism in approaching it from the standpoint of capital, beginning with the 
commonplace commodity, Veblen's choice in The Theory of Business Enterprise to 
proceed from a historically specific presupposition – the modern “business man” – 
allowed him to explore the specific character of modern capitalism from the 
viewpoint of business enterprise. In both cases, we are able to appreciate the inverted 
reality in which we live only by first adopting such a historically-mediated perspective.  
14	  	  
It should be noted before this proposed Marx-Veblen accord proceeds that, 
as	   Ford and McColloch (2012) point out, much of the debate between these two 
“schools” regarding attempted reconciliation is largely based on Veblen’s (1906) explicit 
commentary on Marx’s system. They draw attention in their assessment of Veblen’s 
reading of Marx’s method to the circumstance that, along with his contemporaries, 
Marx’s early works and the Grundrisse were not available to Veblen at the time of his 
writing this piece, so that his impression came primarily from the Communist 
Manifesto and his reading of Capital’s first volume.2 Consistent with the viewpoint of 
this paper, they contend, in line with E. K. Hunt,3 that Veblen’s damning of Marx’s 
system as a “closed, teleological vision of history” stems more from Engels’ rendering 
and popularization of Marx’s system than to Marx himself (p. 768). In short, they 
conclude that at the core of the debate – whether or not Marx’s dialectics suggest a 
historical telos – the Institutionalist literature that objects to a methodological 
reconciliation (as suggested in this paper and by Radical Institutionalist literature) is not 
supported with a passage where Marx implies that there will be a final end to history. 
Rather, he simply suggests that the capitalist system would be followed by determinant 
mode of production. They point to the work of Istavàn Mészàros (2005) who views 
the suggestion that the increasing immiseration of the proletariat should automatically 
bring about a new mode of production as a “fetishization of an economic relation.”  
2 For a full discussion of the tension between Marxist’s and Veblenian Institutionalist, 
as well as their response to Veblen’s critique, the reader is referred to Ford and 
McColloch (2012, pp. 767-770). 
	  
3 “As E.K. Hunt has noted, Marx himself never uses the term ‘dialectical 
materialism.’ Instead, dialectical materialism, conceived as an ontological description 
of matter in motion, is a conception owing wholly to Engels” (2012, p. 11). 
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In his words, “[e]conomic determinism as a historical hypothesis is a contradiction in 
terms because it implies the ultimate negation of history. If history means anything at 
all, it must be ‘open-ended’” (Mészàros, 2005, p. 116; cited in Ford & McColloch, 
2012, p. 770). As Ford and McColloch conclude, For Marx, humankind’s objective 
freedom is constituted by the very lack of a singular teleological project in history. 
Human history is teleological only in the sense that it is a progressive realization of 
human essence; an essence which Marx (as Veblen) does not define a priori as either 
‘good’ or ‘bad.’ (p. 770) A further examination of the topic of historical telos evident in 
the work of Veblen will be addressed later in this paper. 
The remainder of this essay is divided into four sections. The first briefly 
reviews some of the contributions Radical Institutionalist have made in support of the 
argument that the dissonance between Marx and Veblen in much of the literature has 
been needlessly overstated. This will be followed by an examination of Marx’s approach 
to investigation, bringing his mediated starting point to the center of focus and 
connecting this to an underlying essentialism in his viewpoint of economic life. The next 
section considers Veblen’s The Theory of Business Enterprise in light of the parallel in 
starting point, drawing attention to similarity in terms of process, conclusion, and a 
compatible underlying vision of economic life. Concluding remarks underscore the 
significance of these starting points and associated essentialist conceptions of economic 






The Radical Institutionalist literature has long maintained that the discord 
between Marxists and Veblenian Institutionalists is counterproductive. One valuable	  
contribution to this literature is found in Dugger and Sherman (2000). They point out 
that such “open-endedness,” as discussed above, is inherently radical, and is a point of 
intersection between Marx and Veblen from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory.4  
In their view, Marx and Veblen are seen to have both presented properly radical theories 
of evolution. As they put it, “Evolution tells us a very radical story about human 
institutions. It tells us that what is, was not. Furthermore, it tells us that what is, will not 
be forever” (2000, p. 8). They critique both the uncritical Marxist view that assumes 
inevitable historical advancement to socialism, and the “moderate” or “liberal” 
Institutionalist lines of thought that suggest automatic and virtually seamless social and 
technological progress in evolutionary fashion, highlighting the fact that the two schools 
of thought are not so neatly demarcated by their views on social advancement and 
development. They maintain that Marx was the earliest social scientist in the 19th 
century to display a theory of evolution, which includes incremental change as well as 
revolutionary change. As they explain, Marxists point to conflict and power relations in 
the class system, whereas Institutionalists point similarly to the power of vested interests. 
Their principle concern is that the theory of evolution has been used as a “conservative 
weapon,” in the sense that liberal, or moderate, Institutionalists tend to see change as 
rarely taking place through conflict or revolution, whereas “The theory of social 
	  
4 Although they differ from the essentialist view taken here in connecting this lack of 
a singular teleological project in history in both Marx and Veblen to their rejection of 
“something unchanging called human nature.” 
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evolution, as both Veblen and Marx originally used it, was quite subversive” (p. 4). 
They call this return to the radical elements in Veblen’s theory of evolutionary 
social change in the literature “the new Veblenian radical institutionalism.” This 
viewpoint is perhaps best expressed in the passage below: 
Evolution happens because of the internal dynamics of society, not because of 
forces altogether outside of society – this is called endogenous change. 
Evolutionary change does not drop from the sky. And it is not directed from the 
sky. It is not the unfolding of a predetermined plan, divine or 
otherwise…[this] means that evolution  is not  necessarily progress. It is not 
necessarily the moving of humanity toward some level of existence deemed in 
some way to be better or higher than any previous level. Evolution does not 
preclude progress. But evolution itself is not necessarily progress; it is simply 
change caused by internal dynamics. The two may or may not coincide. (p. 8) 
 
As addressed above in the work of Ford and McColloch (2012), this view of 
change not necessarily leading to a “better” system is present in the works of both Marx 
and Veblen, although it would seem that the hope of these two authors was to point out a 
conflict inherent to the existing mode of production in which evolution could occur in a 
way that would afford humans a system more in accord with their essential nature, to be 
more fully discussed below. 
In another constructive contribution to the Radical Institutionalist literature, Philip 
O'Hara (2000) speaks to the issue of teleology in Marx and Veblen. He makes the 
distinction between strong and weak forms of teleology, concluding that Veblen was 
correct in rejecting strong forms of teleology in Marx’s system. These forms are visible 
in the supposition that capitalism would, by design, turn out a privileged subject-object 
of history (the proletariat) alone capable of transcending capitalism. O’Hara argues that 
because the existing literature has tended to focus on Veblen's critique of strong forms of 
teleology, it has overlooked the weak forms of teleology in Veblen's system (Ford & 
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McColloch, 2012). Indeed, in The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial 
Arts,	  Veblen explains that, “[A]ll instinctive action is teleological. It involves holding to 
a purpose. It aims to achieve some end and involves some degree of intelligent faculty to 
compass the instinctively given purpose, under surveillance of the instinctive proclivity 
that prompts the action” (1914/1990, p. 31). He discusses the instinct of 
workmanship, closely tied to the parental bent, as chief among the instincts in its 
intelligent, purposeful aim for the material well-being of the human race: 
The sense of workmanship is like all human instincts in the respect that when 
the occasion offers, the agent moved by its impulse not only runs through a 
sequence of actions suitable to the instinctive end, but he is also given to 
dwelling, more or less sentimentally, on the objects and activities about which his 
attention is engaged by the promptings of this instinctive propensity. In so far as 
he is moved by the instinct of workmanship man contemplates the objects with 
which he comes in contact from the point of view of the relevancy to ulterior 
results, their aptitude for taking effect in a consequential outcome. (1914/1990, p. 
53) 
 
As pointed out in Ford and McColloch (2012), Veblen recognizes that the labor 
process itself is a teleological projection into the future. As Veblen says in “The Instinct 
of Workmanship and the Irksomeness of Labor,”  
[Man] is possessed of a discriminating sense of purpose...It is to his proclivity for 
turning the material means of life to account that he owes his position as lord of 
creation. It is not a proclivity to effort, but to achievement- to the compassing of 
an end. (1898, pp. 188-189)  
 
Beyond this shared conception of labor, weak teleological formulations are also visible 
in Veblen's theory of instincts. As William Dugger (2006) noted, Veblen was deeply 
critical of the essentialism of neoclassical economics wherein human beings are 
conceived as competitive and individualistic by nature. These attacks on essentialism 
should not, however, lead us to conclude that essentialism played no role in Veblen's 
own system. Veblen (1898) seems to argue that a cooperative social instinct, although 
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often obscured or overshadowed by institutionally conditioned patterns of behavior, does 
constitute the essence of human nature.5 [See also Stanfield (1989) for a discussion of 
essence and “becoming” in Veblen and Marx.] Veblen's conception of the instinct of 
workmanship is itself an end-oriented teleological projection. Modern society continues 
to realize technological progress, despite the sabotage of managers and absentee 
owners, because the instinct of workmanship is still manifest in a particular class. Seen 
in this light, what Veblen stridently rejects in Marx is the notion that any historical 
change in the organization of production is necessarily progressive. As we see below, 
this position does not prevent Veblen from affording a potentially revolutionary role 
to the engineers in modern society. The engineers are a potentially progressive force in 
history precisely because they are the modern expression of what is essential to 
humankind: the instinct of workmanship. This, of course, does not imply that the modern 
industrial system will crumble by the force of historical necessity. What it illustrates is 




As Cline, McColloch, and Ford (2011) have argued, in rejecting the idealist 
dimensions of Hegel’s dialectic, Marx implicitly reclaims the materialist dimensions of 
Aristotle’s system. In particular, they demonstrate that Aristotle’s mediated starting point 
is seen to resonate in Marx’s method and to inform his decision to make the commodity 
the point of departure in Capital. As Book 1 of Vol. 1 famously begins: “The wealth  
5 As Dugger has it, for Veblen “within the human breast beat an ancient 
anarchist/socialist heart” (2006, p. 659). 
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of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as 
an ‘immense accumulation of commodities,’ its unit being a single commodity. Our 
investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity” (Marx, 
1887/1992, p. 43). Marx then proceeds to consider capitalism from the viewpoint and 
logic of this commodity, in the quest to discover how profits and surplus value arise in 
competitive capitalism characterized by equal exchange. As is well known, his 
examination requires that after exhausting the possible scenarios in the “noisy sphere” 
of simple circulation, that which is most immediately visible, “where everything takes 
place on the surface and in view of all men,” he moves beyond the realm of immediate 
appearances and “into the hidden abode of production” (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 172)6 in 
order to uncover the essential nature of capitalism. 
The purpose at present is to extend and direct this premise to the mediated 
starting point as it suggests an underlying essentialism in both Marx and Veblen. It is 
here argued that this essentialism underpins the similarity in these two authors’ 
conceptions of modern life and critiques of the capitalist mode of production, in spite of 
certain methodological differences. In order to illustrate this parallel, this paper now 
begins with a review of Marx’s basis for beginning analysis from presupposition. 
As has just been noted, in examining capitalism’s historically specific features, 
Marx proceeds from appearance, or that which is most immediately knowable to us. 
Once the apparent facts are established he moves beyond historical specificities in  
6 As Cline, McColloch, and Ford point out, “The starting point of actually existing 
appearances not only separates Marx from Hegel, but separates him from both Smith 
and Ricardo. While Smith and Ricardo begin with generalities (the division of labor and 
value itself respectively) Marx begins with a concrete appearance, the individual 
commodity” (2011, p. 14). 
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order to identify their essential nature, revealing what “greater” truths are contained in 
their existent form. Consistent with Hegel, Marx denies the subject-object split with his 
dialectic, but rejects the primacy Hegel’s dialectic assigns to the object in thought. 
Accordingly, Marx critiques Hegel for painting history as the history of the “production” 
of abstract, or speculative thought (Marx, 2003). Marx considers this viewpoint to be the 
inevitable result of Hegel’s failure to grasp the nature of his own alienation, the product 
of the alienation of modernity in general. As he says of Hegel’s Logic, “Logic is 
the money of the mind, the speculative thought-value of man and nature, their essence 
indifferent to any real determinate character and thus unreal” (Marx, 2003, p. 174). 
Although he considers Hegel to have gone much further than previous philosophers 
in comprehending man’s self-creation as a process and for arriving at a notion of 
alienation, he maintains that the ideal basis of Hegel’s dialectic prevents him from 
understanding the essential reality of either. As he famously says in the “Afterward” to 
the second German edition of Capital, 
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must 
be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the 
mystical shell. (Marx, 1887/1992, p. 29) 
	  
His critique of Hegel is therefore essential in understanding his own method. 
In the third manuscript of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx 
evaluates Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, which he maintains to be the birthplace 
of Hegel’s philosophy that also contains its “secret.” For Marx, the “main point [of 
Phenomenology] is that the object of consciousness is nothing else but self-
consciousness, that the object is only objectified self-consciousness, self-consciousness 
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as an object” (Marx, 2003, p. 178). In this view – which takes self-consciousness to be 
man – the alienation of self-consciousness constitutes a (seemingly) independent 
substance, or “thinghood.” Accordingly, objectivity is intrinsically alienated from human 
essence, which in order to be overcome, requires the supersession of the object in 
thought. Given that man’s essence is objectified, reappropriation of his objective being 
surmounts both alienation and objectivity.7 In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx 
explains the “illusion” that so confounded Hegel, leading him to embrace this mystified 
view: 
[In] conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, proving its 
own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of 
rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought 
appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by 
no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. (Marx, 
1939/1993, p. 101, emphasis added) 
 
Likewise, in Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
he views Hegel’s conception of the state – a manifestation of alienation in real human 
life, in the same way as is religion – as the result of his transformation of predicate 
into subject. Akin to Hegel’s own notion of ideology as an abstraction that remains 
lodged in the predicate, as Colletti (1972) explains, Marx critiques Hegel for giving 
predicates autonomous existence, and then turning them into their subjects.8 As a 
consequence, the genuine subject emerges as the result. “Precisely because Hegel starts 
7 The latter because it is the objective nature of the object (as opposed to its 
determinant nature) “which is the scandal of alienation for self-consciousness.” In this 
way, the object is “self-annulling” (Marx 2003, p. 184). 
	  
8 As Colletti says, “Existence is not a predicate, it is not a concept. The conditions as 
a result of which something is given to us to be known are not to be confused with 
conditions as a result of which this something is taken up into thought” (Colletti 1972, 
p. 92). 
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from the predicates of the general description instead of from the [actual subject], and 
since, nevertheless, there has to be a bearer of the qualities, the mystical idea becomes 
this bearer” (Marx, 1970/2009, p. 24). Marx again here points to Hegel’s error in 
mistaking the way in which nature presents itself to man as identical to the way in which 
the concrete actually comes into being.9  
In this way, Hegel’s philosophy bears mystification problems, wherein the finite 
is not real, and renders him unable to see that the infinite’s true subject is the real finite. 
Thus, Hegel’s philosophy is itself a manifestation of an inverted reality, is itself an 
expression of alienation in real, sensuous human life. Marx makes it clear that he believes 
the way to avoid falling into this deception is to proceed from the subject, and then 
perceive its objectification (Marx, 1970/2009). 
It can now be argued that the core of Marx’s critique of the Hegelian method lies 
in his chosen starting point, which is at the heart of the connection made in this paper 
between the approaches of Marx and Veblen. Hegel proceeds from pure Being in order to 
avoid being deceived by presupposition. In proceeding from the actual subject, rather 
than predicates divorced from their subject, Marx explicitly wishes to steer clear of this 
confusion. For Marx, deception occurs when proceeding without presupposition, and can 
only be circumvented in a process that proceeds from immediate phenomena grasped 
as such. In The German Ideology he clearly states this of his own method. 
 
 
9 Lucio  Colletti  is  emphasizing  this  same  point  when  he  says,  “Existence  is  not  
a predicate, it is not a concept. The conditions as a result of which something is given 
to us to  be  known  are  not  to  be  confused  with  the  conditions  as  a  result  of  
which  this something is taken up into thought” (Colletti, 1973, p. 92). 
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The method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real 
premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in 
any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible 
process of development under definite conditions. (Marx and Engels, 1947/1970, 
p. 47-48) 
	  
Hence, as historical objective beings, we should begin inquiry with that which is most 
knowable and apparent to us. Method of inquiry, however, must not end here. Scholars 
must make an effort to work through and beyond these initial appearances, without ever 
fully dispensing of them, something that will also be shown to be evident in Veblen’s 
approach to Theory of Business Enterprise below. 
In contrast to the Hegelian world, in which the object has no objective existence 
outside of knowing10 itself, for Marx, objects really exist, are external to humans, and 
are a basic precondition for the use of his human faculties. In this way, objects are both 
the prerequisite and the circumstance for historical human subjects to realize their basic 
nature. He takes as an example the hunger drive, which requires a nature outside of itself 
in order that it be satiated. From this viewpoint, if an objective being is to create 
an object, it need not “descend” from its “pure activity” à la Hegel, given that the 
object authenticates in its activity as an objective being. The activity of such a being is 
objective, precisely because objectivity is constituent of its essential being. In the famous 
example of the architect and the bee, Marx recognizes the object of the architect’s 
laboras the substantiation of his activity as an objective being. It is therefore this 
laborer’s potential, objectified by his own deliberation, and realized in the process of 
10 This is because for Hegel “the object is only the semblance of an object, a 
deception, which is intrinsically nothing but knowing itself which has confronted 
itself with itself, has established in face of itself a nullity, a ‘something’ which has no 
objective existence outside the knowing itself” (Marx, 2003, p. 184). Hence, an object 
arrives at existence for consciousness inasmuch as it knows it to be something. 
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building. At the same time, the essence of the house is brought into unity with its 
existence. Marx explains, “The fact that man is an embodied, living, real, sentient, 
objective being with natural powers, means that he has real, sensuous objects as the 
objects of his being, or that he can only express his being in real, sensuous objects” 
(Marx, 2003, p. 171). The primary premise of human history for Marx is production for 
the means of life, and therefore the production of material life itself (Marx, 1978). 
At this point one word of caution should perhaps be made for the sake of clarity. 
Just as it is a mistake to interpret Hegel’s idealism as the vulgar idealism of the 
philosophers he wished to critique, Marx’s materialism must not be mistaken for those 
mechanistic forms of materialism that both preceded and followed him.11 Although 
Marx pronounced Ludwig Feuerbach to be “the only person who has a serious and 
critical relation to Hegel’s dialectic, who has made real discoveries in this field, and 
above all, who has vanquished the old philosophy,” he was nonetheless careful to 
distinguish himself from this static materialism (Marx, 2003, p. 171). Marx explains that 
Feuerbach’s insistence on grasping the existence of an object as independent from   one’s 
contemplation of it, he is left only able to grasp the sensuous world through a 
philosopher’s “spectacles,” ultimately preventing him from moving beyond that which is 
immediately knowable (Marx, 2003).12 
	  
	  
11 Marx demarcates his “naturalism or humanism” from both the methods of idealism 
and materialism, which he argued also “constitutes their unifying truth” (Marx, 2003, p. 
181). 
	  
12 Feuerbach saw his own approach as the negation of philosophy, the “incarnate 
result” of speculative philosophy which “puts an end to it by explaining it” (Feuerbach, 
1989, p. xiv). In Marx’s theses on Feuerbach in The German Ideology, he says of 
this method, “The object, reality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the  
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As is now clear, for Marx, for historical subjects, whose activity is constituent to 
our essential being, we must begin with such objects that are most clear and knowable to 
us. Marx’s system owes its motion to the human activity of self-creation, a potential 
achievable through a nature that is outside of us, so that the fundamental nature of the 
world is sensuous movement of matter. As will be shown below, this is not 
dissimilar from Veblen’s understanding of the objective world and human subjectivity. 
	  
Veblen’s Process 
As has been seen, the literature is rife with suggestions that despite certain 
theoretical and methodological differences between the work of Veblen and Marx, many 
of their conclusions regarding the operation of modern capitalism may ultimately be 
reconciled. Here there is little disagreement, and in view of this existing body of work the 
present objective is not to add another voice to the chorus. Though it is the view of this 
paper that a profitable Marx-Veblen synthesis could be achieved despite lingering 
tensions, the immediate purpose lies elsewhere (but a few representative examples of 
such efforts may be found in Dowd, 1974; Dugger & Sherman, 1994; O’Hara, 
2000; Pluta & Leathers, 1978; Stanfield, 1989; Sweezy, 1958). Namely, it is contended 
that a striking methodological parallel can be drawn with respect to their choice of 
starting points. 
It should be noted that the purpose of this essay is not to negate or assign a 
superficial role to Veblen’s evolutionary approach. Following Sherman and Dugger 
	  
object or of contemplation but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not 
subjectively” (Marx and Engels, 1947/2004, p. 121). Feuerbach’s fundamental 
shortcoming for Marx is his belief that existence is one and the same with essence, 
and consequently leaves his disciples with a static materialism, taking what is as given. 
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 (2000), evolutionary social theory is inherently subversive in its implications and 
features importantly in Veblen’s view of change.13 Rather, this essay situates his 
evolutionary approach within his own essentialism concerning human nature, where 
Veblen’s work bears most fruit. For Veblen, what is, is not eternal, existent from time 
immemorial. The web of relations, material conditions, and institutional structures 
within which we carry on the life process has origin, sculpted in time and culture, 
constituting its present form. Accordingly, existence is in an unremitting state of 
change, and an understanding of the specific nature of modern economic life requires 
that nothing be taken as given. Indeed, as Veblen is quoted in Lekachman’s Introduction 
to The Theory of the Leisure Class, “What is, is wrong” (Veblen, 1899/1994, p.viii). 
Nevertheless, what is, is precisely where Veblen begins his examination of the 
“modern industrial system” in The Theory of Business Enterprise. As he makes clear in 
the preface: 
[T]he following inquiry into the nature, causes, utility, and further drift of 
business enterprise differs from  other discussions of the same  general range 
of facts. . . The point of view is that given by the business man’s work, – the 
aims, motives, and means that condition current business traffic. This choice of a 
point of view is itself given by the current economic situation, in that the 
situation plainly is primarily a business situation. (Veblen, 1904/1975, p. I) 
	  
Beginning with presupposition is of course not arbitrary; it stems from Veblen’s 
realization of institutional lag. What is, lags behind productive conditions, frustrating the 
circumstances necessary to bring human existence more fully in accord with its 
fundamental nature. Requisite to identifying the discrepancy between institutions and 
	  
13 Sherman and Dugger discuss the misappropriation of the theory of evolution as a 
“conservative weapon,” and propose that the gap between Marxist and Veblenian 
viewpoints can be bridged with useful discourse, on condition that evolutionary theory 
is rescued from misuse. 
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material production is, therefore, a discernment of those features that are peculiar to the 
system. The “business man,” as a principal expression of modern existence, plants 
Veblen’s inquiry solidly in the historically specific features of the present economic 
system, as does the commonplace commodity for Marx. As Veblen says, “In so far as the 
theorist aims to explain the specifically modern economic phenomena, his line of 
approach must be from the business man’s standpoint, since it is from that standpoint that 
the course of these phenomena is directed” (Veblen 1904/1975, p. 4). 
Moreover, as Marx begins with real premises and does not “abandon them for a 
moment,” Veblen maintains this perspective throughout in order to arrive at an 
understanding of the way in which the system functions, and concurrently fails to 
produce the conditions most favorable to essential human life. Through this basic 
framework, Veblen broadly avoids the mystification of universalizing the particular that 
results in an apologia for the status quo. By means of this process, Veblen uncovers a 
system replete with conflict. As is too well known to require an exhaustive summary, in 
examining the shift in the method of business from the “handicraft era” to the “machine 
age” Veblen hits upon a fundamental contradiction in the modern organization of 
economic life.14 That is, business enterprise, or pecuniary life, thrives on means inimical 
to  machine  industry,  or  material  production.  This  prevents  the  complex  of  machine 
industry from realizing its potential (a potential it is autonomously propelled toward in 
accord with its own logic) so that the scheme of production in modern life, although 
sound from the viewpoint of modern business, is “inverted” from the logic of production 
in general. This antagonistic relation circumscribes the existence of business enterprise; 
14 A concise summary of The Theory of Business Enterprise in the context of 
Veblen’s research project may be found in Sweezy (1958, pp.182-188). 
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to prevail over or succumb to the machine process proves ephemeral. Should pecuniary 
life succeed in arresting material production in its pursuit of profit it effectively 
annihilates its material base. If it submits to the logic of industry, it simultaneously 
destroys its “spiritual” base – private property. Thus, business enterprise, by virtue of its 
principality in the organization of machine production, will ultimately hasten its own end. 
As Veblen explains, “[T]he full dominion of business enterprise is necessarily a 
transitory dominion. It stands to lose in the end whether the one or the other of the two 
divergent cultural tendencies wins, because it is incompatible with the ascendency of 
either” (Veblen, 1904/ 1975, p. 400). To be sure, for Veblen human history is a “blind 
drift,” but it is not arbitrary; each historical stage grows out of the previous system in a 
process of cumulative causal sequence, so that as in Marx’s system, the material and 
institutional conditions of present are the basic material for that which will replace it.15 
Considering the weight that has been given to the charge that Marx’s system is “closed” 
it is worth noting once again that this conclusion to The Theory of Business Enterprise no 
more implies determinism in Veblen than a determinant mode of production following 
capitalism does in Marx. For Veblen the decline of business enterprise is “a question not 
of what ought to be done, but of what is to take place” (1904/1975, p. 377). This simply 
suggests that business enterprise will be supplanted by another organizing principle of 
economic life. 
Also emerging from Veblen’s analysis is a view of human social life as an object 
	  
15 For example, mechanical standardization influences the point of view and 
consciousness of workers away from individual ownership. But beyond this, “It also 
furnishes the new terms in which the revised scheme of economic life takes form” as it 
creates the conditions in which trade unions are formed (Veblen, 1904/1975, p. 335). 
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of history, which, in line with Marx’s system, does not deny its inherent subjectivity. It is 
to be remarked that for neither Veblen nor Marx does purposeful human activity imply a 
historical telos.16 When Veblen identifies the worker as a “factor” in the mechanical 
process he is not suggesting a process in which human life is passively impressed upon 
by objective forces. Rather, human labor is contained within the machine process and 
It is by virtue of his necessarily taking an intelligent part in what is going 
forward that the mechanical process has its chief effect upon him. . . .His place is 
to take thought of the machine and its work in terms given him by the process 
that is going forward (Veblen, 1904/ 1975, pp. 307-308). 
	  
Humans create within inherited conditions, and the reciprocal relation between labor and 
the labor process creates a revolutionary potential in the modern age. That is, the 
recognition that private property is the source of productive inefficiency by those 
employed in industry admits a radical element into Veblen’s system.17  Here Veblen’s  
view of labor as both subject and object of history is not only complementary to Marx’s 
own ideas on the nature of labor, but as Hunt observes, adds an important dimension to 
Marxism with his thoroughgoing account of imperialism, nationalism, and emulative 
consumption as factors that absorb this would-be radical aspect of society (Hunt, 1979). 
	  
16 As Stanfield points out, common to both Veblen and Marx “teleological activity” 
(purposeful interaction with material life) is basic to human nature and the progression 
of human life. He contends that “the conscious teleological character of Veblen’s 
instinct of workmanship,” and instinctive action in general, of which Veblen himself 
considers teleological because “it involves holding to a purpose,” is no different from 
purposive human action as a part of human nature in Marx (Stanfield, 1989, p. 98). 
	  
17 As expressed in his (2006) explicit commentary on Marx’s system, Veblen does 
not object to the inclusion of class struggle as a motive force in history, but instead 
to the primacy Marx assigns to it. (See Ford & McColloch, 2012, p. 768.) In The 
Theory of Business Enterprise, Veblen admits agreement with Marxist socialists 
concerning both the inability of the pecuniary classes to adopt a socialistic way of 
thinking and the radical potentiality in society as “proletarian” in substance. He does, 
however, wish to distinguish himself on the basis of what constitutes class, which he 
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As a final point, for both Veblen and Marx, as is well known, the modern system 
of ownership lies at the heart of today’s power relations and is the institution 
humanity must eradicate in order to move beyond the existing mode of production and 
the alienation intrinsic to it. The foregoing analysis makes apparent the basis for such 
uniformity in conclusion. Essential to the picture of economic life that emerges from The 
Theory of Business Enterprise is the contradiction between the deepened social nature of 
production and private property. For Marx, capitalism, in contrast to previous modes of 
production, achieves objective human interdependence in production, a feature of modern 
life that is at once concealed by the asociality of property relations fundamental to this 
mode of production.18 The intensified interdependence of production in the “modern 
industrial system” is also fundamental for Veblen’s theory. 
To be sure, when Veblen speaks of the “machine age” he is referring to the 
complex of industry as a single mechanical process, a scheme of production that grew up 
with the Natural Rights view of ownership and was solidified into an enforced system of  
	  
sees as “a question not of relative wealth, but of work” (Veblen, 1904/ 1975, p. 348). 
Sweezy (1958) argues that while Veblen’s notion of class comes “closer” to that of 
Marx in his later 1923 work Absentee Ownership, the Veblenian and Marxian notions 
of class are easily reconciled in as much as occupational discipline and class interest 
are mutually reinforcing. Even though this is not in disagreement with the viewpoint of 
the present paper, it is also worth noting, as pointed out by Ford and McColloch 
(2012), Marx’s own ambiguity pertaining to the definition of social class. They point 
out in an endnote that this is particularly evident in Chapter 52 of Capital Vol. 3. As 
they put it, “For Marx, to conceive of class merely as a relation to ownership would 
be to treat class as an ‘abstract universal’ in Hegelese. It is only in the subjective 
moment, that is, through class struggle itself, that classes become manifest as ‘concrete 
universals’” (2012, p. 12). 
	  
18 For systematic discussion of Marx’s concept of human nature as it underpins the 
nature of social evolution, see Hunt (1982) “Marx’s concept of Human Nature and 
the Labor Theory of Value,” pp. 2-25. 
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private property. As a result, the “spiritual” foundation of modern economic life tends to 
obscure the growing discrepancy between the sociality of production and antisocial nature 
of property relations. Given the efficiency inherent to both the instinct of workmanship19  
and the machine process, a system capable of providing for the material needs and wants 
of humanity is a potentiality yet unrealized. Hence, the priority Veblen and Marx as 
essentialists assign to the interrelatedness of modern production (itself made visible by way 
of chosen presupposition through which to navigate the specific nature of economic life) 
brings to light the “hidden” nature of ownership. Both conclude that on condition the 
present system of ownership persists, human beings are blocked from living in a system 
more fully in accord with their essential nature. 
	  
Concluding Remarks 
For Marx, inquiry should begin devoid of appearances no more than it should 
begin and end with them, as the result – even if unintentionally – tends to justify existing 
conditions. This is central to his critique of classical political economy. Veblen similarly 
critiques what he termed “neo-classical” economics for universalizing aspects unique to 
capitalism, as, for example, the universalization of private property that legitimizes existent 
class relations just discussed. In taking a similar approach, Veblen arrives at an 
understanding of capitalism in accordance with, and complementary to, that of Marx. It is 
contended that Veblen's chosen starting point – the modern “business man” – in The  
	  
	  
19 The stifling of this essential human instinct, as when labor becomes “irksome,” places 
society in a persisted state of “arrested spiritual development” (Veblen, 1994, p. 254) 
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Theory of Business Enterprise reveals a great deal about his essential methodology, as 
does Marx's choice to begin Capital with the simple commodity form. In both cases, we 
are able to appreciate the inverted reality in which we live and its theoretical apologias, 
only by first adopting such a mediated perspective. It is this rendering of the inverted 
nature of economic life that seems to attract ongoing comparisons of Marx and Veblen in 
the literature of political economy and history of thought, and it is hoped that the 
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The term “Institutional Economics” has been applied to some of capitalism’s 
strongest critics as well as its most ardent apologists. This paradox in terms has bred 
contradictory literature in development economics, some declaring the death of this line 
of thought whereas others herald its resurgence. In examining the roots of Institutional 
economics, this essay attempts to disentangle the ambiguity surrounding this label. The 
Institutional Political Economy of Ha-Joon Chang will then be examined as a return to 
Institutionalism’s radical roots in development economics. Concluding remarks suggest 
that this approach is capable of encompassing gender as an analytical category, an 
extension that would improve the ability of policy makers to assess the impacts of 




A quick glance at development literature can leave the reader with no thought 
other than “institutions matter.” However, such a thought should not be taken for granted. 
What once was precluded from economic lines of inquiry as a consequence of the stale,  
	  
	  
1 Reprinted with permission from Versus Academica. 
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lifeless notion of isolated economic man, has traversed the distance from Classical 
Political Economy, to the center of policy making with the likes of J. R. Commons and 
others, relegated to the underbelly of heterodoxy, and more recently, has basked in 
the limelight of mainstream economics. Indeed, Philip A. Klein pronounced that in spite 
of Paul Samuelson’s declaration of the death of Institutionalism, “in the field  of 
development Economics the victory has been so complete that many economists fail to 
realize it or to credit Institutionalists with contributing any part of the current analytical 
framework of development economics” (Klein, 1977, p. 785). 
However, a review of Institutional literature reveals a remarkable difference in the 
way in which institutions are viewed, the function of private property, and policy 
implications that result. This is the result of a bifurcation in Institutionalism, resulting in 
the categories of Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and New Institutional Economics 
(NIE). This essay examines what distinguishes “old” from “new,” concluding that only 
the former is capable of challenging existing power relations at all levels of inequality. 
The remainder of this essay is divided into four sections. The first surveys Veblen’s 
Institutionalism, the basis of OIE. The next section considers the work of Douglass North 
and Oliver Williamson, the originators of NIE. Having established distinguishing 
features of OIE and NIE, Ha-Joon Chang’s Institutional Political Economy is explored as 







The Economics of Thorstein Veblen 
Veblen’s Institutionalism is rooted within a Darwinian framework; hence he 
considered himself pioneering an “Evolutionary Economics” (Veblen, 1898a). Such 
an	   endeavor was in direct response to Marginal Utility Theory, or, in his chosen 
vernacular, “hedonist” economics. Therefore, in order to understand what Veblen wished 
to construct, it is useful to first understand what he meant to tear down.	  
Veblen brandished the term “neo-classical” ostentatiously at marginalist 
economics – what he considered to be the maladroit child of the “classical” economics 
of the 19th century. While he dismisses both lines of economics as teleological and 
inconsistent in moving from cause to effect within their own theoretical 
underpinnings, he is more critical of the neoclassical school, which “is confined within 
narrower limits and sticks more consistently to its teleological premises” (Veblen, 
1909, p. 621). As is typical of Veblenian sardonicism, his insult swung too high, and 
marginalist economists embraced and adopted the term (Chavance, 2008). 
His critique was complete, arguing that it is ahistorical, “of a wholly statical 
character,” and unable to comprehend the world in which it exists (Veblen, 1919,p. 232). 
This, he argues, is a necessary outcome of an analysis that takes what is, as given. Such 
a starting point renders neoclassical economics nonscientific, shutting off lines of inquiry 
where they should begin. Limited to the narrow range in which values adjust to a given 
situation, it is incapable of grasping origin or human historical movement, perceiving 
only constraints posed by the bounded economic circumstance so assumed. A theory of 
price emerges, but “as to the causes of change or the unfolding sequence of the 
phenomena of economic life they have had nothing to say hitherto; nor can they, since 
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their theory is not drawn in causal terms but in terms of teleology” (Veblen, 1909, 
p. 621). 
In proceeding from a reductionist methodology, neoclassical economics is at 
oncethwarted from analyzing the foundation of habitual action from the perspective of 
the system as a whole, precluding true understanding of sensuous human activity. 
“Hedonistic man” moves through space and time without pulse or consciousness. He is: 
a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogenous 
globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about 
the area, but leave him intact. . . He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in 
stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace 
him in one direction or another. . . When the force of the impact is spent, he 
comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. (Veblen 1919, p. 73) 
	  
Thus, humans are not a living process. They are but matter, with exogenously given 
preferences and void of the human relations of which the social fabric is spun. 
Institutions are “taken for granted, denied, or explained away” (Veblen,1909, p. 
622). Such an abstraction yields a theory lacking correspondence to reality, defeating the 
purpose of theoretical modeling. From this perspective, Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique of 
the “speculative” Hegelian philosophers who “pluck out their eyes that they may see 
better” may just as well have been written by Veblen in view of Utilitarianism 
(Feuerbach, 1989). In economic theory, the stakes of such abstraction are high, above 
all when a school enjoys the status of the dominant paradigm and so persuades policy. 
For Veblen, human and economic development can only be understood in terms 
of growth and change; therefore a true understanding of economic phenomena requires 
that nothing be taken as given (Veblen, 1898). What is, is not eternal, existent from time 
immemorial. The web of relations, material conditions, and institutional structure within 
which we carry on the life process has origin, sculpted in time and culture, 
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constituting its present form. Questions of the life history of human activity are 
questions of cultural growth, which for Veblen, in true Darwinian fashion, is a process 
of nonteleological cumulative causal sequence. 
From this perspective, an inquiry into institutions and their role in cultural 
growth is central. For Veblen, institutions are the customs and “settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of man” (Veblen, 1919, p. 239) As such, these evolutionary 
elements are rooted in culture and explain the historical movement of social structures. 
These social norms and customs become solidified into institutions, which in turn 
come back and shape our customs and habits of thought. In stark contrast to hedonistic 
man with exogenously given preferences, these customs and habits of thought are 
changing endogenously over time. This complex causal relation between individuals 
and institutions underlies Veblen’s notion of cumulative causation, which emphasizes 
sequential change and the cumulative nature of these changes, a “theory of a process of 
cultural growth as determined by the economic interest… of a cumulative sequence of 
economic institutions stated in terms of the process itself” (Veblen, 1898, p. 398). 
Following Bernard Chavance, Veblenian causation can be understood as a type 
of “recursive causation” (Chavance, 2008). Whereas a “linear” notion of causation 
follows cause to effect and considers its work complete, recursive causation continues, 
bringing to light the influence effect has on cause. Veblen tells us that human life “is a 
struggle for existence, and therefore it is a process of selective adaptation. The evolution 
of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions” (Veblen, 1994, 
p. 188). In understanding his complex causality we can see that institutions are both 
object and factors of selection in this process of selection.	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Institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process 
which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; 
they are at the same time special methods of life and of human relations, and are 
therefore in their turn efficient factors of selection. (1994, p. 188) 
	  
Thus, preferences become “endogenized” in this evolutionary process (Chavance, 2008). 
Once this cumulative causation is understood, it becomes clear that Veblen’s 
rejection of methodological individualism in no way implies that the study of human 
beings is outside the scope of understanding economic phenomena. Indeed, it is variation 
in cultural customs and habit that gives motion and change to social structures. 
Changes in the material facts breed further change only through the 
human factor. It is in the human material that the continuity of 
development is to be looked for; and it is here, therefore, that the motor 
forces of the process of economic development must be studied if they 
are to be studied in action at all. (Veblen, 1898, p. 388) 
	  
Once this is understood we can see that Veblen was neither purely holistic, nor 
purely reductionist, but moved between the social whole and the individual with 
methodological consistency (Hodgeson, 2004). 
In order to fully understand Veblen’s approach to economics and growth, it is 
important to grasp his theory of human nature, which he emphatically rejected as static. 
The way in which Veblen accounts for human active nature is in his theory of instincts 
(Hessian & Sardy, 1969). According to Veblen, humans have certain innate instincts that 
embody both potential and propensities. These instincts are genetically and culturally 
inherited and conditioned, and are more or less manifest depending on the particular 
historical and material conditions individuals reside in, which is to say, human nature 
adapts to the demands of the situation. 
These instincts fall into two general categories: those that are advantageous to the 
social whole and those that are injurious. Among the former are the instincts of parental 
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bent, idle curiosity, and workmanship. The latter set of instincts includes predatory 
behavior, arrogance, and emulation. One of the main drivers behind human behavior is 
status, and the instinct of arrogance compels individuals to put this into evidence by 
making invidious distinctions. However, that which bestows status, and the form that 
invidious distinction takes, is dependent on historical circumstance. For example, in 
primitive communal societies the instinct of workmanship (a taste for effective work and 
distaste for “futile effort”) was a point for invidious distinction. An individual 
demonstrated efficiency by doing work that promoted survival of the group. With the 
dawning of economic surplus cultures became warlike societies, bringing the predatory 
instinct into dominance. Aggression, seizure, and plunder became the “accredited form of 
action,” and a conspicuous display of ill-gotten gains became the way to put status into 
evidence. As a result, an invidious distinction between exploit and industrial employment 
was created, and engagement in industrious behavior became socially inferior and 
“irksome” (Veblen, 1994). 
For Veblen, economic growth in capitalism is threatened by the dominance of 
the predatory instinct, as it breeds inefficiency and waste. His notion of growth rests in 
his evolutionary system and cumulative causation. Therefore, his concern was not with 
short-run fluctuations in output, but rather one of long-run structural change and the 
composition of output. Thus, increased output is not a sufficient condition for economic 
development. For sustained growth to occur, output must be of the type that smoothes 
the progress of technological advancement (Hessian & Sardy, 1969). The composition 
of output is critical for Veblen because in the very process of growth, the institutional 
fabric	  of the economy is transformed. Technology is itself an institution, as both object 
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and factor of selection, shaping capitalist institutions and the social mind-set. As Veblen 
explains: 
The mechanical equipment and the standardized processes in which the 
mechanical equipment is engaged. . . embodies not the manual skill, dexterity, 
and judgment of an individual workman but rather the accumulated technological 
wisdom of the community. (In Gruchy, 1958, p. 161) 
	  
From this view, technological progress has an evolutionary function, challenging 
existing institutions and the power relations embedded in them. 
However, Veblen did not maintain that the mere appearance of some new 
technology would directly bring about the new institutions that would allow for the full 
effect of technological progress. He recognized an institutional stubbornness, making 
economic growth a strained and often broken process. The difficulty lies in what 
he termed institutional lag. This is the observation that there is ever a gap between 
today’s institutions and the current needs of society. “Institutions are products of the past 
process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with 
the requirements of the present” (Veblen, 1994, p. 191). Given that each step in 
institutional evolution is shaped by what was before, cumulative causation necessarily 
entails institutional inertia. This is exacerbated by an inherently antievolutionary 
element that tenaciously resists progressive tendencies. Social inertia, or “past-bound 
drag of cultural habit wedded to privilege,” is solidified in the present in what Veblen 
called “imbecile institutions” (Jennings & Waller, 1994, p. 110). Those in power are 
capable of impeding new social interpretations that would allow society to address 
the needs of today, and their imbecile institutions rationalize their power position, 
spilling over into the attitudes	  of those lower in the social strata. Veblen recognized 
that neoclassical economics in all ways fits this bill, hence his scathing critique of its 
44	  	  
method. 
They are principles of action which underlie the current, business-like scheme of 
economic life, and as such, as practical grounds of conduct, they are not to be 
called in question without questioning the existing law and order. (Veblen, 1909, 
p. 626) 
	  
In other words, the neoclassical paradigm functions as an apologia for the 
existing state of affairs. To question its validity is to question nothing short of the 
whole of society, and the power relations therein. 
Veblen illustrates the way this power elite acts as an antievolutionary element to 
social progress in his Theory of the Leisure Class, which demonstrates the role and 
extent to which the leisure class, a refined version of yesterday’s predatory class, 
affects the social structure. Put simply, there occurs a “selective elimination” of 
individuals who dare challenge the status quo. That is not to say that those who 
recognize institutional lag and the “imbecile institutions” that perpetuate unhappy social 
relations are entirely eliminated – this would remove the variation required for an 
evolutionary system. It does, however, highlight a significant source of rigidity in terms 
of institutional adaptation. 
When the invidious distinction of a society is attached to nonindustrious 
occupations, as is the case in capitalist enterprise where the predatory instinct dominates 
“captains of industry,” economic growth is threatened. The upper tier of the social strata 
gain prestige by putting their lack of engagement in productive work on conspicuous 
display, engaging in conspicuous consumption (a conspicuous waste of goods) and 
conspicuous leisure (a conspicuous waste of time). This lifestyle establishes a standard 
of living for all of society, changing general habits of thought and disseminating an 
ideology	   of inefficiency and waste throughout the culture. In this regard Veblen 
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astutely recognized the antirevolutionary nature of society in general. From this 
perspective the lower social strata, engaged in productive efforts, not only face 
obstacles to bringing about social change with the barrier of imbecile institutions, they 
simply do not wish to revolt against those who hold the power. Rather, they aim to 
become one of them. Should this effort fail, which it most certainly will, they will at 
least attempt to look and act like them through pecuniary emulation of conspicuous 
waste and leisure.	  
Returning to his notion of economic growth, Veblen saw the potential in new 
technology to eventually corrode imbecile institutions and restructure society in 
conformity to its needs. This is a potential because Veblen saw no reason that it had to 
unfold this way. As a result of complex and cumulative causality, Veblen saw human 
history evolving in a “blind drift,” or in the manner of path dependence (Jennings & 
Walker, 1994). That part of the population that is immediately in contact with the 
technological process would have the instinct of workmanship more strongly 
expressed in their nature, and consequently would develop a matter-of-fact way of 
viewing their world. This class would necessarily recognize the inefficiency of the 
captains of industry, and would ultimately take over the productive process to ensure 
efficiency in production (Veblen, 1914/1990). Veblen did not conceive of this as a swift 
or seamless process, and lamented the considerable waste that society would incur in 
this evolutionary unfolding. He saw only two paths the United States could pass over: a 
road to socialism, or a road to complete fascism (Gruchy, 1958). This latter road would 
be the consequence of assiduous exploitation of the working masses by the vested 
interests. 
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Those who followed the Veblenian tradition, termed OIE, carried on many of his 
themes: placing institutions at the center of analysis, recognizing the role of technology in 
growth and the nonautomatic nature of its dissemination, and the centrality of cumulative 
causation in economic development. However, from this they extracted an optimism 
rather than pessimism. For these Institutionalists a third road appeared on the horizon, 
one in which the human element in the recursive causation between individuals and 
institutions plays an active role in eroding imbecile institutions. Economists such as 
Clarence Ayres, J.R. Commons, and Wesley Mitchell saw the Veblenian insight as one in 
which policy could be the tool to fashion capitalist institutions in a way that would 
promote efficiency and limit its tendency to reproduce and deepen economic inequality. 
As Paul M. Sweezy points out, “Veblen treated the United States as the 
prototype of an advanced capitalist society, just as Marx, writing earlier, had assigned 
that role to Great Britain”(1958, p. 177). He may well have said this of Veblen’s earliest 
disciples, who “used the U.S. economy almost exclusively as their geographic unit of 
analysis” (Peach, 2003, p. 128). However, over time Institutionalism did begin to gain a 
global perspective as economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith and Wendell Gordon 
began to apply the institutional paradigm to their studies of development and 
international economics, and economists outside the U.S., notably Nobel Laureate 
Gunnar Myrdal, also made use of the institutional framework to discuss international 
economic issues (Peach, 2003). From being in the center of U.S. economic policy in 
the early part of the 20th century, to marginally existing on the fringes of heterodox 
economics by the latter half, this “Old Institutionalism” has nonetheless survived to 
inform modern economists who are attuned to its basic tenets. As will be discussed 
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below, it has made a particularly useful reemergence in the field of development 
economics. 
As will be argued below, not all Institutional economics are created equal. By the 
mid-1970s a development in economic thought bearing the name “Institutional” emerged 
from a paradoxical source: Veblen’s so-called “neo-classical” economics. Appropriately, 
it was a qualified Institutionalism, lest it be dismissed as a return to a radical Veblenian 
school, and thus New Institutional Economics, or NIE, was born.  
 
 
New Institutional Economics 
The names Douglass North and Oliver Williamson have become synonymous 
with this branch of economics. Broadly speaking, the assumptions underlying this 
deductive school of thought are the existence of certain institutions because they have the 
lowest transaction costs, and the notion that institutions should be envisaged as the 
interactions of individuals from which institutions emerge. Although at times there may 
be some recognition of endogenized preferences through the influence of institutions, this 
typically enters in ad hoc and fails to be fully wed to theory. For methodological 
legitimacy to be maintained, analysis begins with Homo economicus, justifiable as an 
“Ideal Type” in the vein of Max Weber. According to Malcolm Rutherford, the 
fundamental distinction in outlook “shows up in the tendency of new Institutionalists to 
see the development and functioning of institutions largely in efficiency and economizing 
terms. . . as opposed to the old Institutionalist who tends to see many other social and 
political factors (status, group identity, ideology, and economic and political power) as 
also involved” (Rutherford, 1995, p. 444). 
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For Williamson, emphasis is placed on transaction costs, adapted from 
Coase’stheory of the firm. This necessarily entails a study of individual action and 
rationality. As will be seen with North as well, one of the first tasks Williamson sets 
for himself is a reevaluation of the notion of strict rationality of methodological 
individualism. This is achieved with a “bounded rationality,” such that the individual 
agent, in pursuit of self- interest, is limited by the inability to perfectly predict the risks 
and uncertainties implicit in contract agreements. In Williamson’s own words, this 
rationality “refers to rate and storage limits on the capacities of the individuals to 
receive, store, retrieve and process information without error” (1973, p. 317) In contrast 
to Simon Herbert’s bounded rationality, which results in satisficing behavior in the 
individual, Williamson’s usage of this concept is terminal in transaction costs. 
Additionally, the individual is thoroughly infused with “opportunism,” which is “an 
effort to realize individual gains through a lack of candor or honesty in transactions” 
(Williamson, 1973, p. 317). Though coercion is not within the  economic agent’s given 
motivation set, the individual is “farsighted” in terms of outcomes and will conceal or 
bend information to the other party in pursuit of the best possible outcome, thus yielding 
high costs in transaction. 
The institution of interest to Williamson (1998) is the “governance structure,” 
which is where transactions and negotiations occur. When specific investments must be 
made by either buyer or seller in a transaction, a problem of “asset specificity” arises. It 
becomes more cost efficient for these two parties to merge than remain separate and incur 
rising transaction costs. This “mutual dependence” therefore occasions the need for a 
governance structure capable of organizing their activities. Changes in these structures 
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change the comparative costs, such that the “institutional environment is a ‘shift 
parameter’ – a datum for the actors” (Groenwegen, Kerstholt, & Nagelkerke, 1995, p. 
470). Although Williamson recognizes agents as they may try to influence legal 
institutions, this is not decisive to his analysis. In the end, this leads him to praise the 
“institutional reforms” of the Washington Consensus, which place private property and 
contract enforcement at the heart of the policy agenda, as pointed out by Herrera (2006). 
Similar to Williamson, Douglass North wishes not to replace neoclassical theory, 
but rather to “build on, modify, and extend” it in order to incorporate a theory of 
institutions into economics (North, 1993). He maintains the assumptions underpinning 
microeconomics of competition for scarce resources, and therefore sees the study of 
economics as a theory of choice subject to constraints. For North, institutions should be 
central to any economic theory as they are the critical constraints individual agents 
face in achieving their objectives. Drawing upon Coase, he sees institutions formed by 
economic agents in order to decrease uncertainty in exchange, and he emphasizes the 
connection between neoclassical theory, institutions, and transaction costs: 
The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to 
transact. When it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And because a large part 
of our national income is devoted to transacting, institutions and specifically 
property rights are crucial determinants of the efficiency of markets. [Coase’s] 
insight is the key to unraveling the tangled skein of the performance of 
economics  over  time, which is my primary concern. (North, 1993, p. 2) 
	  
What we see from this statement is that the assumptions underlying neoclassical 
economics are not incorrect per se, but rather that we live in a world of asymmetric 
information and therefore market imperfections. If this could somehow be rectified, 
institutions would cease to be of economic relevance. This stands in stark contrast to a 
Veblenian understanding of the nature of institutions. As fundamentally social 
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beings who must organize in order that production takes place, institutions are the very	  
substance of human life. Thus, from a Veblenian perspective the phrase 
“institutions matter” goes without saying, and necessitates no qualification (Veblen, 
1898a). 
However, working from a framework that places individuals as the proper 
starting point for analysis, North accomplishes his task of incorporating institutions into 
the neoclassical paradigm by modifying “instrumental rationality,” as this is the element 
he pinpoints as the source that causes institutions to vanish from neoclassical 
analysis. Under its strict assumptions, individuals operating on the basis of instrumental 
rationality necessarily act on the basis of optimization, with the choice of ends as given. 
In such a scenario there is no need to discuss the role of institutions; they simply do not 
enter analysis. As has already been established, however, in our lamentably imperfect 
world (lamentable on the grounds that we have not achieved perfect competition), 
“institutions matter.” North looks for his modification to the strict rationality of 
methodological individualism in the way in which human beings process information. 
According to cognitive science, humans possess mental modes that allow them to 
understand their world. These are bestowed upon us through culture, which articulates 
values, norms, and custom, as well as through our experiences within our “local” 
environment. In this way variation in mental modes and world perception can be 
accounted for. Individual action stems from these mental modes, and can be altered if 
presented with an experience that contradicts what would have been expected on 
the basis of these modes. This results in “multiple equilibria.” As a result, world 
perceptions are limited and vary widely from one individual to the next, creating an 
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environment riddled with asymmetrically held information and an inability to process all 
the necessary information required for transparent and harmonious exchange. 
Returning once again to Coase, information bears a high price in this environment, and 
it is this in combination with contract enforcement costs that the costs of transaction are 
determined. The upshot of this line of reasoning is that institutions, in order to reduce 
the uncertainty inherent in exchange, are born of transaction costs. 
What has emerged is a linear causality: from individuals to institutions. Not 
surprisingly then, North has a different conception of institutions. They are, “the rules 
of the game of a society, or more formally, the humanly-devised constraints that 
structure human interaction,” which entail both formal, and informal institutions, as well 
as the “enforcement characteristics of both” (1993, p. 5). These he distinguishes from 
organizations, which are the “players,” grouped together by function and purpose. 
For example, firms, labor unions, churches, and political parties all fall under 
organizations. Institutional change, or “modification,” then takes place based upon 
individual maximizing behavior. If individuals believe they can improve their outcomes 
by reorganizing the terms of exchange, they will do so, and incremental, path dependent 
institutional change transpires. In a notion that reminisces of Veblen’s imbecile 
institutions, North argues that the individuals and organizations with bargaining power 
in a society are also the agents that have a stake in maintaining the system. The 
consequence he sees to this is that an economy on an “inefficient” path will persist on 
this as a result of the institutional inertia the privileged are able to sustain. 
For North, the primary driver of institutional change and economic growth is not 
the engineer that Veblen saw such revolutionary potential in, but the entrepreneur 
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within an organization. Entrepreneurial “learning” dictates both the rate and direction of 
economic change. While North does grant Veblen an element of “idle curiosity,” he 
does not factor it into his motivations for invention and innovation. His purpose is to 
give an “institutional/cognitive story” of economic change in the long run. The true 
source is to be found in the neoclassical assumptions that stand at the base of the New 
Institutional Economics. The more competitive is a market, the higher the rate of 
learning and the faster will economic change occur. The type of learning that takes 
place governs the direction in which economic change moves, and is a reflection of the 
mental modes of the individuals involved and the incentive structure as determined by 
the institutional framework. The primary incentive structure is, of course, strong 
property rights. What North gives us then is a radically conventional story of the 
entrepreneurial spirit motivated by pecuniary gain, nurtured and made stronger with the 
institution of private property. 
North, as promised, brings his thesis to the State, as the institution that 
enforces the so-called “rules of the game.” This, he argues, is an improvement upon 
neoclassical economics, which typically views the State as exogenous or irrelevant to 
economic development. Here the emphasis is on “getting prices right” by removing State 
action that would inhibit the natural movement of prices toward equilibrium. Adhering 
to the principle of perfect competition in theory, North argues that this holds true only 
if property rights are such that the conditions for competitive markets are created and 
sustained. “It is polities that shape economic performance because they define and 
enforce the economic rules of the game. Therefore the heart of development policy must 
be the creation of polities that will create and enforce efficient property rights” (1993, 
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p. 7). In this way he has brought institutions into light not just as constraints, but 
also as entities that can enable economic agents, specifically, by improving efficiency. 
Although North has indeed brought institutions to the center of analysis, NIE is 
still theoretically bound to a notion that holds the competitive marketplace as the natural 
ordering of economic life. The State has a place insofar as it supports the objective 
of maintaining it where it is existent, and cultivating this environment where it is 
deficient. As Malcolm Rutherford again points out, 
Despite his references to the limited computational power of individuals, to 
cognitive psychology, and to the influence of social norms – all of which 
lead us to rule-guided behavior, North persists in describing the activities of 
individuals and entrepreneurs predominantly in terms of self- interested 
maximization. (Rutherford, 1995, p. 447) 
	  
Groenwegen et al. conclude similarly, “the [NIE] is of an individualistic, deductive 
nature. After having characterized the transaction, different potential governance 
structures are discussed in terms of their transaction cost minimization. Then hypotheses 
are confirmed using historical examples” (1995, p. 471). While North makes mention of 
the Veblenian elements of power, ideology, and myth, they are not effectively 
integrated into his theoretical assumptions, and therefore fail to play a decisive role 
in the policy prescription that follows. When causality runs from the self-interested 
individual to institutions, and institutions are deemed the “rules of the game,” 
institutional policy is one of either constraining or channeling individual behavior in a 
way that yields optimum efficiency. 
The appeal of such reasoning is not difficult to see. What has emerged is a 
straightforward guide to economic development that tends to justify the existing state of 
affairs in capitalist developed countries, and is backed with all the legitimacy of the 
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dominant paradigm in economics. Indeed, the World Bank adopted the philosophical 
underpinnings of this NIE by the early 1990s, as the phrase “institutions matter” 
became increasingly ubiquitous. A quick survey of this literature reveals institutions as 
“rules of the game,” with emphasis placed on contract agreements and strong property 
rights. (See for example Javed & Perry, 1998, and Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Network, 2000.) Establishment of robust property rights, alongside other 
“good” institutions that would foster “good governance,” became the strategy for 
promoting economic growth worldwide. 
It is in this context that Ha-Joon Chang can be understood, as he offers up a 
direct response to this development in the Washington Consensus. His critiques of this 
policy and the methodological foundations that guide it bear striking resemblance to 
Veblen’s critique of neoclassical economics. This is of no accident, given that NIE is 
firmly rooted in neoclassical economics and Chang is a methodological return to OIE. 
Taking a historical approach to the study of economics, critiquing the dominant 
paradigm for taking what is, specifically institutions, as given, recognizing institutional 





Ha-Joon Chang’s Institutonal Political Economy 
	  
	  
One of the fundamental critiques Chang has of the “so-called New 
Institutional Economics” is that an emphasis on institutions is not enough, and he finds 
fault in its failure to break from neoclassical economics in a n  authentic and 
essential way (Chang, 2003b). Insofar as NIE views institutions as constraints that 
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can generate inefficiencies, as a school of economic thought it is entirely consistent 
with the mainstream economics, and demonstrates a linear causality. Where it adds 
dimension to the orthodox conception of institutions is in the recognition that 
institutions can also play an “enabling” function. However, as was seen in North, “they 
still maintain the myth that the unconstrained market is the natural order, while 
institutions are man-made substitutes that should be (and will be) deployed only when 
that natural order breaks down” (Chang & Evans 2005, p. 102). Bringing institutions to 
light, Chang argues, is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition in understanding the 
nature of economic development. Institutions do matter, but the way in which they are 
understood is of grave importance. As Chang points out, even good intentions, if 
misinformed, can mean utter devastation to a nation. Institutions deemed “good” and 
“natural” in capitalist developed countries are transplanted onto developing capitalist 
countries, often with great consequence. Thus the definition and understanding of 
institutions is far more than an exercise in semantics, “people are hurt because social 
scientists and policy makers misunderstand institutions” (Chang & Evans, 2005, p. 
100). 
To remedy this misconception of the nature of development in general, and 
institutions in particular, Chang develops a theoretical framework of Institutional 
Political economy, or IPE. (Chang, 2003a) From this perspective institutions are 
defined as “systematic patterns of shared expectations, taken-for-granted assumptions, 
accepted norms and routines of interaction that have robust effects on shaping the 
motivations and behavior sets of interconnected social actors” (Chang & Evans, 2005, p. 
99). Thus, institutions are not axiomatically taken as the maxims of a game, but run 
56	  	  
much deeper, indeed into Veblen’s customs and habits of thought, highlighting human 
nature as one of social being. From this vantage point, a view of human life as it 
interacts with institutions recursively once again emerges. 
Chang refers to this interaction as the “constitutive” nature of institutions, which 
highlights an endogenous process of preference formation. In starting at the 
cognitive level before theoretically erecting institutions built of individual maximizing 
rituals, NEI maintains exogenous preferences and thus fails to recognize the profound 
nature of their basic unit of analysis. For Chang, institutions are such a part of the social 
fabric that they transform the very substance that motivates us. IPE, then, does not take 
human motivations as given, 
But as being fundamentally shaped by the institutions surrounding the 
individuals. This is because institutions embody certain ‘values’ and, by 
operating under these institutions, individuals inevitably internalize some of 
these values, thereby altering themselves. This [constitutive role of institutions] is 
a central hallmark of a truly ‘Institutionalist’ approach. (Chang 2007, pp. 54-55) 
	  
There are three “mechanisms” by which this constitutive aspect operates. First, 
institutions have the capacity to shape what human beings perceive to be in their 
interest. Second, they are of the nature that they can imbue the common view of which 
issues are valid for political action, and, finally, institutions shape what is perceived to 
be the legitimate forms of such political action (Chang, 2002). Institutions are 
constraints, to be sure, while also having the capacity to enable in the sense that North 
discussed above, but must also be understood as one element of a two-way street of 
causation. From the perspective of NIE it is a narrow one-way path, with direction 
running from individual (cause) to institution (effect.) Although more “sophisticated” 
approaches have emerged from the simple dimensions of NIE, Chang and Evans (2005) 
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argue that the challenge of developing a strong theory of culture remains. 
Much of Chang’s historical analysis reveals a Veblenian institutional lag. Indeed, 
this is the main thrust of his book Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy 
in Historical Perspective. Looking at institutions such as universal suffrage, central 
banking, protection of property rights, and child labor regulation in the now developed 
capitalist countries, or NDCs, he demonstrates temporal delay from when the need 
for these institutions surfaced and when they finally became institutionalized. For 
example, universal suffrage in the U.S. was not achieved until a full 95 years after the 
vote was given universally to men. Even this is misleading, however, as this universal 
male suffrage was reversed only 20 years later as African American males were 
disenfranchised, and did not witness their voting rights restored until 1965. In the case of 
Switzerland and France it took nearly 100 years (Chang 2007). Furthermore, a 
comparative look at GDP per capita reveals that the NDCs were much wealthier at the 
time they erected these “good” institutions than has perhaps been perceived. “In the 
early days of their economic development, the NDCs were operating with far less 
developed institutional structures than those which exist in today’s developing countries 
that are at comparable levels of development” (Chang, 2003b, p. 515). Even once these 
institutions were erected in the NDCs it was not a seamless process. As shown above in 
the case of male suffrage in the U.S., reversals often took place. Thus, arguments that 
claim that “good governance” preceded and fostered growth are simply inaccurate. 
When put in historical perspective, precisely the reverse thesis emerges. 
Although Chang makes clear that reasons for institutional lag vary country by 
country, there are broadly two explanations underpinning this gap. Put simply, 
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institutions are expensive, and it was untenable to adopt social welfare programs 
when resources were lacking. There is also, however, an element of “social inertia” that 
takes place. Once again, a historical view reveals that the wealthy elite actively block 
progressive change. Although he does not use the term “imbecile institutions,” Chang is 
capturing the essence of the way in which Veblen’s privileged class was able to hinder 
social change. Child labor laws and voting rights were not in the interest of the upper 
tier, and through their control over institutions they were able to hinder such 
developments for decades in the U.S. However, Chang is not entirely pessimistic. The 
constitutive nature of institutions has the consequence that when an institution is put into 
place what once was unthinkable, such as banning child labor, over time changes 
human motivations. Child labor is now universally accepted as inappropriate and 
exploitative in the NDCs. Furthermore, this recognition of privilege wedded to power 
does not mean policy cannot be actively altered, it merely highlights the challenges that 
will be faced. As Chang and Ilene Grabel argue, “it is both fatalistic and incorrect to act 
as if their [IMF, World Bank, and WTO] power and influence are absolute and 
immutable” (Chang & Grabel, 2004, p. 203). 
Chang also stresses the significance of institutional inheritance in the formation 
of new institutions, the result of which is institutional path dependency. From this 
view, new institutions are adaptations of old institutions, and are erected of the same 
material. “The strong element of legacy, inertia, and path dependence in the 
determination of institutional forms” must be recognized by those who would ask 
capitalist developing countries to implement a “global standard” of “good” institutions 
in as short a time span as 5 to 10 years (Chang & Evans, 2005, p. 104). Again, it 
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must be remembered that it often took the NDCs generations to develop their current 
institutions. It must also be recognized that not all institutions packaged as “good 
governance” are necessary. The imposition of an unneeded institution may come at the 
cost of other, necessary institutions. 
Having outlined Chang’s approach to development economics, it is worth 
returning to what is perhaps the most fundamental critique waged at the NIE: the 
tendency to take institutions as given. For Veblen this was what rendered 
neoclassical economics ineffective, shutting off the “inquiry at the point where modern 
scientific interest sets in” (Veblen, 1919, p. 240). What Veblen was pointing to was the 
tendency to observe current institutions, generalize them, and then view all times and all 
places in history through this lens. With such an approach to history it is no surprise 
that verifications abound. This method presupposes that what is, must be right. The 
notion of institutional lag, however, would suggest just the opposite. As Veblen is 
quoted as saying, “What is, is wrong” (Lekachman, 1994, p. viii). Chang continually 
refutes ahistorical theory and policy that assumes, in essence, that regarding 
institutions in the NDCs – particularly the U.S. – what is, is right. “History is written 
by the victors, and it is human nature to reinterpret the past from the point of view of 
the present” (Chang, 2007, p. 64). 
Among the most critical institutions to have been presumed “natural,” with 
perhaps the greatest consequence, is that of private property. According to E.K. Hunt, 
one of the defining characteristics of OIE “has always been its concern with the 
organization and control of the economy. This has inevitably involved an analysis of the 
structure of power – a topic systematically avoided by the mainstream economists. For 
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most Institutionalist economists an analysis of power necessarily involves a study of the	  
complex institution of property. . .” (Hunt, 1994, p. 54) Indeed, one of Veblen’s major 
tasks was to move beyond the “Natural Rights” view on the origin of private property 
to uncover the genesis of modern ownership (Veblen, 1898b).	  
For Veblen, ownership is a cultural fact that must be learned, not a fact of 
nature to be presupposed. According to the natural-rights theory, the “natural” owner of 
some object is the individual that either produced it, or somehow improved upon it. 
The basis of ownership in this view then is rooted in a self-sufficing individual, an 
individual Veblen denies has ever existed. 
Within the human period of the race development, it is safe to say, no individual 
has fallen into industrial isolation, so as to produce any one useful article by his 
own independent effort alone . . . .The only possible exceptions to this rule are 
those instances of lost or cast-off children nourished by wild beasts. . . But the 
anomalous, half-hypothetical life of these waifs can scarcely have affected social 
development to the extent of originating the institution of ownership. (Veblen, 
1898a, pp. 33-34) 
	  
Not only is the self-sufficing individual a mythical creature, but a glimpse into our own 
history reveals that being engaged in the production of some article does not entitle 
one to that which they produce. As Veblen sagaciously observes, serfdom and 
slavery are clear demonstrations that “those who work cannot own, and those who own 
cannot work” (Veblen, 1898a, p. 42). He includes women’s productive efforts in the 
patriarchal home as another example of this aphorism, ultimately rooting the 
“beginnings of ownership” to the seizure of women and the products of their labor once 
apprehended. Ownership of a “trophy wife” becomes the preferred way of putting one’s 
physical prowess into evidence and demonstration of invidious distinction. Passed from 
one generation to the next, this becomes solidified into the institutions of ownership-
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marriage and private property. NIE, in contrast, views the function of private property 
quite differently. From this perspective the modern form of ownership is not a 
conflictive element in society, but is the foundation upon which successful capitalist 
countries were built. Bestowed upon this institution is the power to unleash the 
entrepreneurial spirit, so it is not surprising that the origin of private property is rooted in 
special cultural characteristics. Although not the first to emphasize culture as the source 
of capitalist development, David Landes is representative of this line of thought. He 
argues that the origin of private property is to be found in medieval Europe, specifically, 
the Judaic-Christian tradition (Landes, 1999). Although not all New Institutionalists who 
argue that private property is the key to capitalist development see the genesis of 
modern ownership in culture, the story and policy converge with the conventional 
story once the institution of private property is historically reached. For example, 
authors such as Daron Acemoglu see existing wealth and labor exploitative opportunity 
of colonizers as the basis for this institutional development (Acemoglu, Johnson & 
Robinson, 2002). Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) place emphasis on geography and 
factor endowments as the route to private property. Once this stage is reached, 
entrepreneurial energy, from which economic growth and development springs, is 
allowed to flourish. As Landes says, “why should anyone invest capital or labor in the 
creation or acquisition of wealth that he may not be allowed to keep?” (1999, p. 32). 
Chang points out that it is this myth of the sanctity of private property and 
the promotion of privatization through the Washington Consensus that is the cause for so 
much hardship in capitalist developing countries. The New Institutionalist neoliberal 
view sees patents, copyrights, and trademarks as critical in the development of the NDCs 
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and argues that monetary incentives for invention and innovation are the only 
appropriate incentives. Although arguing that at times privatization is the appropriate 
policy, Chang and Grabel (2004) point out that this process is both expensive and 
complex. It results in a great burden on the State, even as the private sector profits. In 
terms of patents and copyrights, historical canvassing does not support the claim that 
economic growth follows from strict property rights. In fact, it supports just the 
opposite. Much growth in NDCs took place before patents and copyrights were existent, 
or when they were particularly weak (Chang, 2007; Chang, 2003a; Chang 2003b; Chang 
& Grabel, 2004). Furthermore, not all motivations underpinning invention and 
innovation are of a pecuniary nature. History, Chang points out, is full of examples of 
innovation driven by a motivation for the public good. Yet the Washington Consensus 
enforces strict intellectual property rights, privatization, and enforcement of private 
property in the name of economic growth. In looking at such policy as dictated by the 
NDCs via the WTO, World Bank, and the IMF on the developing world, Chang (2007) 
concludes that once the advanced capitalist countries secured core status in the world 







The distinction between NDCs and developing capitalist countries is then one of 
power, wed together by imbecile institutions, and fortified by the institution of private 
property. It is a return to the powerful Veblenian understanding of institutions and 
the role of private property as a power relation. In making such a return, Chang’s 
International Political Economy (IPE) opens a powerful door for policy that 
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includes gender as an analytical category, as it allows emphasis to be placed on 
individuals, households, and institutions, while enriching and understanding of the way 
in which these shape one another. Indeed, Veblen wrote much on the subjugation of 
women both in the household and in society at large. Due to the constitutive nature 
of institutions, the inclusion of gender is not only compatible with IPE, as it brings 
equal emphasis to individuals in their cultures and institutions, but would enrich and 
strengthen it in terms of developmental policy that would otherwise be invisible. 
In 1970 Ester Boserup demonstrated the significance of the omission of women 
in the study of international and development economics, ushering in a wave of 
literature that has attempted to rectify gender blind analysis. More recently, feminist 
literature has called for an approach to economics that allows its practitioners to see 
into the “black box” of the household. Numerous authors have cataloged male-biased 
development policy and its consequences, including the inability to accurately assess the 
true impact of macroeconomic policies aimed at increasing efficiency as long as the 
unpaid portion of the labor force is invisible. (See for example Elson, Grown & 
Cağatay, 2007.) Though this paper does not attempt to develop an IPE that encompasses 
gender as an analytical category, having established the connection of Chang to Veblen, 
this can be seen a useful undertaking for future research. As James T. Peach argued, 
Institutional economics is itself an institution (Peach, 2001). As such, it is critical that 
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THE CAPITAL DEBATES AND MAINSTREAM POLICY ADVICE:  








The global crisis of 2007 has shown the limitations of the mainstream approach. 
We trace the origins of the limitations of the dominant neoclassical views to the 
capitals debates and to the rise to dominance of intertemporal general equilibrium. We 
use the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a case study of this perplexing continuity 
of policy advice. Given our survey, we conclude that even though the economy was in 
the midst of the worst capitalist crisis since the Great Depression, a significant 







Economic theory has been in a state of crisis since the 1960s. Nevertheless, the 
ability of mainstream economists to provide policy advice has been left wholly 
undisturbed. The nature of this crisis is seldom noticed, given that most economists are 




1 Portions of this essay have been reprinted with permission from the Cline, N., Ford, 
K., & Vernengo, M. Because I said so: The persistence of mainstream policy advice. 
Journal of Philosophical Economics, III(2) (Spring 2010), 97-121. 
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macroeconomic model presented to undergraduates and underpinning most policy advice 
by professional economists is incontrovertible. Where there is a vague notion of the 
limitations associated with the idea of aggregate capital, brought to light during the so- 
called capital debates of the 1960s, it is presumed that these issues have been 
satisfactorily dealt with by the disaggregated Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (GE) 
model. 
In this sense, the capital debates, having left unaffected the foundations of 
mainstream economics, are a mere curiosity and should be relegated to a footnote of the 
history of economic analysis. However, contrary to this widely shared narrative, the 
capital debates brought about significant theoretical change in the mainstream, and, in 
fact, the failures of the conventional theory revealed in these debates in effect 
produced the authority of Arrow-Debreu intertemporal general equilibrium in 
mainstream theory. What is striking about this theoretical shift is that at the same time 
the capital debates proved simple parables of relative prices determined by scarcity 
and driving allocative choices generally invalid, admitted by Paul Samuelson, economic 
theory became dominated by an unrelenting neoclassical model that celebrates the 
potential efficacy of unencumbered markets. 
It is thanks to the unassailable nature of the Arrow-Debreu model, from the 
neoclassical point of view, that the defense of market fundamentalism sprang to the 
policy arena in the 1970s. In this way, the ascendancy of the Arrow-Debreu model 
following the capital debates is as substantial a factor as the repeal of the Keynesian 
consensus is to the methodological and sociological shift that occurred in the profession 
in this decade. The rise of the rational expectations hypothesis, the development of the 
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efficient market hypothesis, and the relegation of heterodox economists to the margins of 
the profession (e.g., by denying tenure, or constraining the ability to publish in the same 
journals) emerge in this sense as a direct result of the capital debates and subsequent 
adoption of the Arrow-Debreu notion of equilibrium. 
Arrow-Debreu provided an authoritative attestation that markets are, in some 
sense, efficient. Roma locuta est, causa finita est; Rome has spoken and the debate is 
over. It is for this reason that no significant change in policy advice, comparable to 
the theoretical change, took place. The theoretical model is logical, but it is not 
directly useful for policy analysis; the aggregative model is, on the other hand, is readily 
available for empirical application – even if the evidence is sometimes contradictory – 
but lacks logical consistency. Since mainstream economics is either logically defective 
or flatly irrelevant, we conclude that it is authority, rather than logic or empirical 
evidence, that provides the basis of mainstream policy advice. 
The remainder of the essay is divided into three sections. The following section 
describes the main elements of the capital debates and how the issues raised led to the 
rise to dominance of intertemporal general equilibrium. The subsequent section expounds 
upon the limited use of the Arrow-Debreu model in terms of policymaking, and 
demonstrates the persistence of policy guided by the aggregative model. In the last 
section, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used as a case study of this perplexing 
continuity of policy advice. Given our survey, we conclude that even though the 
economy is in the midst of the worst capitalist crisis since the Great Depression, a 






The Return of Vulgar Economics 
	  
	  
The capital debates remain a puzzling chapter in the history of ideas. Nearly 
everyone accepts that the British (as opposed to the Massachusetts) Cambridge won the 
debate, something Paul Samuelson acknowledged early on.2 Yet no one seems to grasp 
the full implications and relevance of the debate itself. Typically it is assumed that the 
capital debates relate simply to problems of aggregation, and that the use of aggregate 
production functions and aggregative measures of capital is still justifiable, for 
simplicity’s sake. However, contrary to this viewpoint the capital debates did not rest 
upon the possibility of building aggregate measures. 
The capital debates are associated with the very notion of capital. Classical 
political economy authors, from William Petty to Karl Marx, including Quesnay, Smith 
and Ricardo, treated the process of production as a circular one. In this context, capital is 
a produced means of production,3 rather than a factor of production used in the process of 
obtaining final goods. The most important result of the capital debates is that, once 
capital is defined as produced means of production, there is no direct relation between the 
relative abundance or scarcity of the means of production and its remuneration. 
Distribution, in other words, is not governed by supply and demand. 




2 See Samuelson (1966). A typical position is that of Robert Lucas (1988) who notes 
the victory of the British argument, and yet remains oblivious to the problems of using 
the aggregate production function in the same paper. 
	  
3  For Marx (1867, p. 189), capital also involved a social relation between the owners 
of the means of production and those forced to sell their labor power. For him, capital 
“can spring to life, only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence 
meets in the market with the free laborer selling his labor-power.” 
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school, the notion that relative prices are determined by supply and demand, and that 
these reflect the relative abundance or scarcity of all goods and services – including 
factors of production – gained consensus. As a result, the supply and demand for capital 
became the determination for the remuneration of capital. The more abundant is capital, 
the lower its remuneration, and vice versa if it is scarce. Conflict has no role to play in 
the determination of distribution, and social classes vanished entirely from analysis. 
Additionally, substitution leads to the full utilization of resources and their 
optimal allocation. If capital is scarce and expensive, and labor abundant and cheap, 
economic agents substitute labor for capital and fully utilize labor. Thus, despite the 
abundance of labor, its relative cheapness, through the principle of substitution, leads to 
full employment. Indeed, unhampered markets do lead to the veritable best of all 
possible worlds. 
It is the logic of the principle of substitution, based on relative scarcities, that the 
capital debates shattered. Contrary to the neoclassical parable, the capital debates showed 
that it is not generally possible to obtain an univocal relation between remuneration and 
relative scarcity. For example, assume that we have two commodities produced with 
capital and labor, and that one can be said to be univocally more capital abundant than 
the other. In this case, as capital becomes more abundant the profit-to-real-wage ratio will 
fall, more capital will be used, and more of the capital-intensive good will be produced. 
However, it is possible that one good will be more capital intensive at high levels of the 
profit-to-real-wage ratio, and that the other becomes the capital intensive good at lower 
levels of the same ratio. That is, we would have factor intensity reversal. In the instance 
of factor intensity reversals, the conventional relation between factor scarcity and relative 
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prices breaks down. 
In this situation, it would be possible that as the profit-to-real-wage ratio falls, 
more labor will be used, and more of the labor-intensive good will be produced. In other 
words, there would be reverse capital deepening and a lower rate of profit associated with 
a reduction in the use of capital. Substitution moves in the wrong direction, so to speak, 
and more of the scarce factor is demanded. The implications for neoclassical theory 
cannot be overstated. First and foremost, there is no relation between relative scarcity and 
the remuneration of factors of production, and, as a result, distribution is not simply the 
product of market forces. Further, there is no guarantee that all resources will be fully 
utilized.4 
It must be noted that, even though the capital debates are fundamentally about 
the logical coherence of the neoclassical approach, the results of the capital debates have 
important empirical implications. Neoclassical theory makes strong predictions vis-à-vis 
substitution effects and the relation between relative scarcity and remuneration. Yet the 
capital debates suggest that some of those predictions might not be consistent, and, as a 
result, the absence of those relations might be expected in the real world. 
The most obvious prediction is the inverse relation between investment (capital 
intensity) and the rate of interest (its remuneration). As it is well known, there is little 
evidence that investment is sensitive to variations in the real rate of interest. In a rare 
	  
4 Both results are important, for example, for the Keynesian possibility of 
unemployment equilibrium. Keynes’ (1936, p. 243) emphasis on the unimportance of 
the natural rate of interest not only implies that the supply and demand for capital 
(loanable funds) do not determine the equilibrium rate of interest, but also that the 
conventional rate of interest may be set at such a level that brings about persistent 
unemployment. 
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survey of the empirical literature on the determinants of investment, Robert 
Chirinko (1993, p. 1906) argues, “[T]he response of investment to price variables tends 
to be small and unimportant relative to quantity variables.”5  Similar results are obtained 
by Heim’s (2009) more recent study. In other words, interest rates have little effect on 
gross capital formation, and the substitution effects that imply that agents use the cheaper 
factor of production are not operative. Further, the empirical evidence suggests that 
investment reacts to quantity variables, meaning the level of activity. This suggests that 
the income effects tend to supersede substitution effects and that a firm facing less 
demand will not buy capital goods, even if the interest rate is low. These results 
underscore the empirical relevance of the capital debates.6 
Similarly, the capital debates highlighted the futility of using the aggregate 
production function to measure the growth and productivity performance of real 
economies. The theoretical problems with the aggregate production function, associated 
to the notion of capital as a scarce resource, are compounded by the impossibility of 
disentangling it from the identity of income with the structure of the functional 
distribution of income (Felipe & Fisher, 2003). In other words, if one runs a regression of 
income on capital and labor, as is often done by those using a production function, it  
 
	  
5 In a recent empirical study Atesoglu and Emerson (2008, p. 1051) claim to find 
support for neoclassical models while arguing that “the effect of R [real interest rate] on 
I [investment] is always positive (sic),” for the American economy. 
	  
6 In the same way, the empirical evidence seems to contradict the notion that 
higher wages would lead to substitution of cheaper factors  of  production  for  labor.  
The exemplary case is the well-known study of the fast food industry in New Jersey, 
which found a positive correlation between the minimum wage and employment (Card 
& Krueger, 1995). 
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by definition the wage multiplied by labor utilized in production plus capital multiplied 
by its remuneration. 
In this way, the capital debates leveled the theoretical foundations of neoclassical 
economics, and provided significant empirical evidence that neoclassical models and 
their resultant policy prescriptions should be viewed with a healthy measure of 
skepticism. Faced with the impossibility of using both the notion of aggregate capital 
and the principle of substitution, neoclassical economics opted to apply the principle of 
substitution to each kind of capital good taken as a distinct factor of production, by using 
the Arrow-Debreu model of intertemporal general equilibrium (Garegnani, 1976; 
Milgate, 1979). Even though the idea of treating capital as a vector of heterogeneous 
capital goods was first developed by John R. Hicks in the 1930s, and used by Arrow and 
Debreu in the 1950s, it was only after the capital debates that it came to be dominant 
within the mainstream. 
The problem with the use of heterogeneous capital goods is that it implies a 
change in the traditional method of economics. Normal equilibrium positions are 
associated with a uniform rate of profit; however, when dealing with heterogeneous 
capital goods that are not substitutable between each other, it becomes necessary to 
discard the notion of long-run equilibrium. In Arrow-Debreu models all prices are short-
run prices, associated with differential rentals for each capital good, and any change in 
the data of the system – preferences, technology, and information for given initial 
endowments – affects the direction to which the economy adjusts (Petri, 2003). In other 
words, the forces of competition that lead capitalists to those sectors with higher 
remuneration and establish a uniform rate of profit do not operate in the Walrasian  
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world.7 Hence, the Walrasian models are incapable of ascertaining tendencies in real 
economies, a defect that is not mitigated with the introduction of imperfections (Stiglitz, 
1993, p. 109), which Stiglitz calls the post-Walrasian and post-Marxist paradigm. Far 
from increasing the realism of the model, the casting about of such lifelines only 
complicates the results of an exceptionally unrealistic one. 
Information imperfections, and other related imperfections such as price rigidities 
or lack of rationality, once introduced leave the Arrow-Debreu model unable to produce 
Pareto efficient solutions, or even market equilibrium, since some markets may not exist. 
Additionally, the introduction of imperfections renders the aggregative model prone to 
suboptimal outcomes. Suboptimal results in the presence of imperfections suggest that in 
their absence markets would still produce optimal outcomes.8 Some authors tend to 
confuse the imperfectionist arguments, and the implicit support that they provide for 
policy intervention, as a break with orthodoxy. Although it is clear that they provide 
space for flexibility in policy advice, they remain firmly based on orthodox grounds.9 The  
	  
7 That GE models do not support the notion that the abundance of a factor of 
production will be associated with lower remuneration has been pointed out by a 
survey of those models (Bliss, 1975). 
	  
8 The same is valid for Bowles and Gintis’ (1993, p. 84) notion that market exchanges 
are usually contested and endogenous enforcement costs are not zero, and, as a result, 
there are conflicts of interest among exchanging parties. Therefore, if enforcement costs 
were nonexistent  the  Arrow-Debreu  results  would  prevail.  It  must  be  noted  that  
all  the literature  on  post-Walrasian  economics  presumes  continuity  between  the  
classical political economy authors and the postmarginalist revolution economics, 
which would mean that there are no significant distinctions between Smith, Marx, 
Walras, and Arrow. For a debunking of those views see Garegnani (1984). 
 
9 Colander et al. (2007-8), for example, seem to suggest that several of the post- 
Walrasian developments can be seen as breaking up with orthodoxy. For a critique 
see Vernengo (2010). 
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capital debates, in contrast, showed that unhindered markets free of imperfections of any 
type, do not lead to market efficiency in general. 
Faced with the logical problems that neoclassical aggregative models are riddled 
with on the one hand, and the irrelevance of general equilibrium models on the other, 
neoclassical economists did what any rational agent would do: disregard the critiques 
and in so doing, their deleterious results, and proceed as if nothing had happened. 
However, an innovative development generated a curious division of labor within 
neoclassical economics. Aggregative models were deployed for the purposes of teaching 
and policymaking, while the Arrow-Debreu model became the retreat of neoclassical 
authors when questioned about the logical consistency of their models. A tradeoff 
between logical consistency and relevancy was thus formed in the core of mainstream 
economics. 
The degree of fragmentation – as Roncaglia (2005, p. 468) so aptly expresses it 
– and confusion in the mainstream today is the result of such inconsistency at the core of 
economics, and not, as is frequently asserted, because of the demise of the Keynesian 
consensus. The collapse of the certainties provided by the old aggregative neoclassical 
model brought about an often-cynical defense of market-oriented policies for their own 
sake. The return of Vulgar Economics, which “sticks to appearances … [and] 




Do the Same, But Expect Different Results 
	  
	  
Given the less than paltry theoretical change in neoclassical economics that the 
capital debates forced, a comparable change in policy advice would be expected. Yet in 
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the policy arena, the virtues of the unfettered market were extolled with more fervor in 
the decades following this expedient shift in the conventional notion of equilibrium. 
Here, we use the International Monetary Fund as a case study of the perplexing 
continuity of policy advice through discontinuity of policy results. The IMF provides a 
unique example of an institution dedicated to economic policy and empirical research, 
which has been attuned with the mainstream of the profession. Hence, significant changes 
in policy orientation would be expected as a result of theoretical developments that 
change the basic underpinnings of policy models. 
Countries facing balance of payment difficulties receive financing from the IMF 
in installments, conditional upon meeting such performance criteria as outlined in the 
country agreement. The IMF compendium of macroeconomic stabilization techniques 
endures more or less in its original form as developed by IMF Research Director Jacques 
Polak in 1957 (Pieper & Taylor, 1998). Its modus operandi for hitting inflation 
and output targets consists of doctoring the exchange rate and austere fiscal and monetary 
measures. The former typically entails devaluation and opening up capital accounts of the 
balance of payments, whereas the latter involves maintaining high interest rates and 
reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, with price stability as the overarching goal. The 
philosophical underpinnings of all policies made by the IMF are the efficacy of free 
markets, making liberalization the antecedent for most policies. 
The performance of IMF guided policy makes this unbending nature of policy 
advice puzzling, at best. The historical incongruity between promised results and actual 
outcomes would suggest that empirical observation plays little to no role in informing 
policy makers at the IMF. Pieper and Taylor (1998) survey the effects of Structural 
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Adjustment Programs (SAPs) across nations, demonstrating a mélange of results.  In 
many cases, the economic consequences that come at the heels of these programs are the 
very failures liberalization professes to circumvent. This is not a tragedy of coincidence; 
the assumptions that permeate neoliberal strategy tend to be at odds with economic 
reality. As they point out, the macroeconomic model developed by Polak “presupposes 
that reducing the fiscal deficit automatically leads to a lower trade deficit with no effects 
on output. Such projections frequently turn out to be false” (Pieper & Taylor, 1998, 
p. 41). Even with the assumption that output and employment tend to their natural levels, 
when implementing drastic cuts in fiscal spending in tandem with a sharp reduction of 
imports, the upshot is a policy-induced recession. 
Stagflation is not uncommon in countries made to comply with IMF 
conditionalities, as SAPs typically contain contradictory policies, and exchange rate 
adjustment proves far thornier in practice than in theory. Historically, devaluation has 
produced mixed results, whereas fixed exchange rates, which tend to feature in many 
IMF programs, have succeeded in reducing purchasing power for workers and increasing 
labor costs in sectors that produce traded goods. The result, as witnessed in Argentina, is 
anything but anti-inflationary (Weisbrot & Ray, 2010). Often carried out alongside 
devaluation is the removal of capital controls, provoking price and output volatility, 
as the exchange rate becomes an asset price for speculative international finance. In spite 
of such patent policy failures, SAPs and other country agreements changed very little, if 
at all, throughout the 20th century. Pieper and Taylor (1998, p. 41) remark that while 
the general accord has shifted away from more extreme positions, “[t]he essentials, 
however, have not changed.” 
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Perhaps the only consequence of such a perseverant mismatch between policy 
forecast and outcome was declining pertinence – a reality Dominique Strauss-Kahn was 
privy to when he came in as the Fund's managing director in 2007. As he said just 
before being named the new managing director, “What might be at stake today is the 
very existence of the IMF … the two main issues are relevance and legitimacy” (as cited 
in Weisman, 2007). As the financial collapse that originated in the United States spread 
to the rest of the world, many of the poorest countries were made increasingly vulnerable 
to balance of payments crises. The IMF’s feudal horn sounded once again as it brokered 
packages for Hungary, Iceland, Pakistan, and Ukraine. The news media declared the IMF 
back in business, leaving legitimacy the only difficulty for the IMF to surmount. 
The result has been a slew of papers and statements ensuring the public that today’s Fund 
is friendly, flexible, and rethinking macroeconomic policy (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, & 
Mauro, 2010). 
In January 2008, Strauss-Kahn advocated “timely, targeted, and temporary” 
counter-cyclical fiscal spending in the Financial Times. As is the custom, there is a 
caveat. Only nations with low levels of debt should employ fiscal stimulus, and, as 
always, monetary policy is “the first line of defense" (Strauss-Kahn, 2008). Provided 
stable inflationary expectations and a credible monetary authority prevail, countries 
should make the requisite interest rate reductions before resorting to fiscal spending. 
Insofar as inflation lies in wait – due to external shocks or a push for higher wages – 
caution must reside with any decision to use monetary policy. Chapter five in the Fund’s 
2008 World Economic Outlook, titled “Fiscal Policy as a Countercyclical Tool,” 
expounds upon the “three Ts” of fiscal policy with the same admonishment as 
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Strauss-Kahn’s initial statement (International Monetary Fund, 2008a).10 Accordingly, 
underpinning the IMF’s “new” attitude toward public spending is an unwavering faith in 
the ability of markets to self-correct quickly. 
That the IMF is rethinking policy, rather than revamping or reconstructing it, is 
visible in the country agreements fashioned over the course of the current world 
economic crisis. Weisbrot, Ray, Johnston, Cordero, and Montecino (2009) analyzed 
agreements the Fund made with 41 countries during the current global downturn, 
including Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs), Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities 
(PRGFs), and Exogenous Shocks Facilities (ESFs). Of these agreements, 31 contained 
procyclical fiscal and/or monetary policies. Fifteen of these agreements contained pro- 
cyclical policies in both fiscal and monetary measures. Similarly, a study conducted by 
Molina-Gallart (2009, p. 7) that looks at the SBAs of 10 low-income countries made 
between December 2008 and May 2009 finds that as the IMF propagates its image as 
flexible and in favor of pro-poor spending, “this is not what the IMF has been advising, 
during the very same months, to the world’s poorest countries.” For these low- 
income countries, IMF programs maintain tight fiscal policy, and any improvements in 
terms of flexibility are “timid and exceptional” (Molina-Gallart, 2009, p. 17). Of the 10 
country agreements made, all 10 must reduce spending, none can defer debt payments, 5 
promote wage bill cuts or freezes, and 5 are instructed to decrease their fiscal deficit. 
	  
10  Yet even if this diffident posture could be interpreted as a break from IMF 
tradition, discretionary spending in times of crisis is scarcely novel in conventional 
economics. In the 1930s Chicago Economics, in objection to Keynes’ position that 
fiscal policy is an elemental tool for sustaining full employment, assigned a role for 
fiscal stimulus, to be utilized only in economic contractions when monetary tools have 
become ineffectual (Pérez & Vernengo, 2010). 
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to hike interest rates and boost the level of their official reserves (Molina-Gallart, 2009). 
The double standard between some degree of fiscal flexibility for wealthier 
nations and fiscal austerity for poorer nations notwithstanding (Weisbrot et al., 
2009), stringent monetary policy has proven the rule, rather than the exception for 
the “new” IMF. As Ilene Grabel (2010, p. 25) notes, “[T]he IMF has been far less 
flexible with this policy instrument than it has been with fiscal policy.” In her survey 
of the most recent SBAs, contractionary monetary policy emerges as a major 
component of many country agreements. For instance, in 2008 Ukraine’s SBA calls for 
a reduction in inflation from 25.5% to a mere 5-7% by 2010; Hungary’s agreement 
imposes an inflation target of just 3% by 2010. Correspondingly, the SBA drawn up for 
Pakistan requires that interest rates be raised by 200 basis points, and the SBAs for both 
Iceland and Latvia require interest rate increases of 600 basis points (Grabel, 2010). The 
circumstances surrounding such policy advice in Latvia, which signed an SBA in 
December 2008, is one of the more stark examples of the Fund trying the same thing, but 
this time expecting different results. 
The agreement contains massive cuts in government expenditures, higher 
taxes, and wage cuts in the public sector with the intention of extending these to state-
owned enterprises. The IMF staff report for the Request for Stand-By Arrangement 
states that the “effects from these measures, together with the slowing economy, should 
also lead to substantial nominal wage cuts in the private sector” (IMF, 2009, 19). In all, 




“appropriately ambitious” (IMF, 2009, 25).11 
The Fund projects improvements for Latvia and many other countries beginning 
this year and lasting several years, demonstrating its steadfast faith in V-shaped 
recoveries (Weisbrot & Ray, 2010). This projection testifies to the IMF’s perplexing 
habit of proffering the same sets of policies and expecting different outcomes. The belief 
in the self-adjusting nature of the economy is above questioning; the actual experience is 
not particularly important in the decision making process. 
Acclaim for the pro-cyclical antilabor policies put forward by the IMF was 
followed by the well-publicized IMF Staff Position Note titled, “Rethinking 
Macroeconomic Policy,” yet one more piece in its effort to persuade the public that the 
“new” IMF is all about mitigating the pains of recession (Blanchard et al., 2010). The 
two main components to receive attention from this paper are, first, a proposal to increase 
the inflation target from 2% to 4%, and second, a discussion of the permissibility of 
discretionary fiscal spending in conjunction with automatic stabilizers. That either of 
these policy amendments were received as a break from IMF tradition is a testament to 
the tenacity of policy advice, even if it tends not to yield the expected results. 
When these policy discussions are read within context, it becomes clear that 
neither signify departure from convention. The purpose of raising the inflation target is to 
give countries room that would enable them to cut interest rates in times of crisis. Yet the 
authors underscore the notion that this should be explored much further before being put 
into practice. In an interview published in the online IMF Survey Magazine, Oliver 
	  
11  For all of its posturing, when Latvia exceeded its IMF target by ending 2009 with a 
deficit of 7% of GDP, the Fund praised it for its stringent actions that were only 
possible by providing limited relief to the hardest hit in this recession (IMF, 2010). 
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Blanchard, the IMF’s chief economist, wonders if the limited flexibility many countries 
felt in their ability to respond the current crisis is enough to “justify setting a higher 
inflation target in the future” (Clift, 2010). In other words, he is not as of yet persuaded 
that raising the inflation target, even by 2 percentage points, is warranted. 
In terms of fiscal policy, little is new. Discretionary spending has a role to play in 
recessions, provided debt levels are such that there is room for fiscal spending. At the 
same time, it is emphasized that countries must aim for lower debt-to-GDP ratios 
than they had prior to the world recession. While automatic stabilizers are suggested for 
consideration, progressive taxation and social insurance programs “would be warranted 
only if they were based on a broader set of equity and efficiency objectives, rather than 
motivated simply by the desire to stabilize the economy” (Blanchard et al., 2010, p. 15). 
The preferred approach to this type of fiscal policy is just a small deviation from 
discretionary spending in crises. These automatic stabilizers would include temporary 
transfers, flat tax rebates, and cyclical investment tax credits, activated when a 
determined threshold is crossed. Blanchard suggests an 8% unemployment level as one 
such possible threshold (Clift, 2010). Reforms along these lines appear “more promising” 
as they are less costly. To this could be added, ameliorations of this type do not effect a 
genuine structural and institutional movement away from free markets. 
Nevertheless, the authors are apt to alleviate concerns that the IMF is actually 
rethinking macroeconomics. According to them: 
It is important to start by stating the obvious, namely, that the baby should not be 
thrown out with the bathwater. Most of the elements of the precrisis consensus, 
including the major conclusions from macroeconomic theory, still hold. Among 
them, the ultimate targets remain output and inflation stability. The natural rate 
hypothesis still holds, at least to a good enough approximation. . . .Stable 
inflation must remain one of the major goals of monetary policy. Fiscal 
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sustainability is of the essence. (Blanchard et al., 2010, p. 10). 
	  
Not only does the IMFs inflexibility on monetary policy effectively nullify any 
genuine support for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and, therefore pro-poor spending, but 
even the slightest suggestion that policy analysis should be reoriented is defended on the 
basis of how it acquiesces to the mainstream of economics. Viewed in this light, it is 







Economists have frequently argued in favor of laissez faire policy, and the 
reasons underpinning this position have been more often than not been associated to their 
ideological perspective. Whenever the classical authors defended the free market, 
however, it was never under the presumption that it would lead to full utilization of 
resources or an equitable distribution of income. The free market was typically defended 
as an instrument of modernization, that is, an institutional innovation of the rising 
bourgeoisie against feudal obstacles to economic development. It was only with the rise 
of the neoclassical paradigm that the free market came to be equated to efficiency in the 
use of factors of production, and a mechanism for the determination of income shares of 
the same factors of production. With this, free markets ceased to be defended as an 
instrument of modernization, and instead were propped up as a superior institution in 
itself. The Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution sapped the faith in free 
market policies, but did not attack the core ideas behind the marginalist views of market 
efficiency.	  
The attack on the main tenets of neoclassical economics that started with the 
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Keynesian Revolution in the 1930s and culminated with the capital debates in the 1960s, 
showed the logical limitations of the marginalist approach, and forced the mainstream 
into a defensive position. With the abandonment of the old notion of long-run 
equilibrium, and the adoption of intertemporal equilibrium, the efficiency of markets was 
not seen as the result of the persistent forces of the economy. If nothing else, the new 
notion of equilibrium provided a logically coherent notion of market efficiency. Absent 
solid theoretical foundation, and, oftentimes, empirical support, the persistence of 
laissez-faire policy could at least be anchored to the authority of intertemporal 
equilibrium. 
The limitations of such a strategy have become increasingly evident. The 
duplicity of a profession that teaches models known to be logically incorrect, and uses 
these very models for policy analysis – even when the actual outcomes do not correspond 
to the expected results according to the prescription – is hard to justify. The role of the 
social conflicts of the 1960s, the inflation of the 1970s, and the rise of several corporate 
institutions in the rise of promarket policies have been extensively analyzed. However, 
the role of the changing attitudes within the economics profession has  seldom 
emphasized the incisive effect that the capital debates had in promoting the revival of the 
defense of free markets for their own sake. 
The current global crisis has shown the limitations of the promarket liberalizing 
policies of the last few decades, but from our perspective, it will not be sufficient to 
promote a meaningful revision of the foundations of economic analysis, and the 
timidity of the IMF rethinking of its policy stance is a good example of what to 
expect. In the meantime, learning economics at least remains, as Joan Robinson 
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In this dissertation it has been argued that there is a common Institutionalist 
approach evident in the works of Marx and Veblen, and it has further been suggested that 
more generally this Institutionalism is compatible with the view of economic life shared 
by most heterodox economists. This Institutionalism has been contrasted with more 
recent renditions of “Institutional Economics” to demonstrate why it is essential for 
well- reasoned economic analysis and effective policy-making (economic analysis that 
corresponds to the existing state of affairs and not a fictitious economy of unencumbered 
markets overlaid with institutions) that heterodox economists reclaim the Marxist and 
Veblenian roots of Institutionalism that clearly place power relations in the center of 
analysis. An effort has been made to show that the dissonance between Marxists and 
Veblenian Institutionalists is unnecessary at the level of abstraction presented in the first 
essay of this dissertation, and, moreover, it is here argued that the rift between these two 
“schools” is counterproductive to a clear, cogent approach to heterodox economics that 
can cohesively and ardently challenge the dominancy of neoclassical economic 
theorizing in academia and the policy-making arena. 
The shortcomings of mainstream theorizing itself have also been demonstrated, 
both in terms of internal consistency and weakness of policy outcomes. The capital 
debates ushered in an environment of confusion and a splintering of theory within the 
dominant paradigm, such that heterodox economists are undertaking research and 
	  instructing students of economics in a system rife with the revenge of vulgar economics. 
This trend seems only to have been intensified with the recent capitalist crisis in spite of a 
mainstream that has advocated increased flexibility in its approach to policy; counter to 
what many heterodox economists (this author included) had hoped. It is the task of 
heterodoxy to unremittingly challenge this state of affairs in the modern capitalist 
system, and in the words of Bortis, to “broadly classify theories so that eventually a 
loosely structured body of economic science might obtain” (1997, xvi). Here a 
suggestion for such a classification capable of encompassing Institutional insight as 
outlined in this dissertation is proposed. There is, thankfully for all involved, no bold call 
for a theoretical “reinventing the wheel,” so to speak. A clear and straightforward 
framework already exists, but is all too often left out of heterodox discussion. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, the conflict between 
Marxists and Veblenian Institutionalists is only one of many fissures in heterodox 
approaches to economic research. Such discord also exists among various Keynesian and 
post-Keynesian “schools” of economic thought. What is needed, this dissertation argues, 
is a recognition of commonality in underpinning views of economic life, which it 
has been proposed be simply termed “Institutionalism,” placed within an existing 
theoretical structure capable of incorporating the various views of heterodox 
economists. As Bortis has it, Keynesian-Institutionalism adds great insight to 
economic research, but it is not sufficient. The Keynesian contention that full 
employment is vital to reducing aggressive and counterproductive trade policy that 
plagues the capitalist world-system “gains its full force only if Keynesian employment 
theory is combined with a theory of value and distribution based upon the classical 
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(Ricardian) approach” (1997, xxi). 
Bortis, in line with much of the Sraffian literature, calls for a classical-Keynesian 
broad basis of approach (in the tradition of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and Keynes) to replace 
the neoclassical approach (of Walras and Marshall) because it is a more “fundamental” 
framework that allows for more diversity and historical specificity in investigation. 
Future research can contribute to this advantageous project for heterodoxy by clarifying 
this conceptual framework for economic analysis and demonstrating its ability to take 
into account the institutional and historical specificities of the inquiry at hand. 
As is well known, and perhaps best articulated by Garegnani (1984), the strength 
of the classical model, or “surplus approach” that has origin in Quesnay’s Tableau 
Economique, is its great flexibility. Indeed, its use across authors as diverse as Smith, 
Ricardo, and Marx is a testament to its ability to maintain its integrity while 
containing differing political outlooks. Important works done by Sraffa, and extended by 
Garegnani, Petri, Pivetti, Pasinetti, and many others in the classical tradition, highlight 
this strength by demonstrating its compatibility with various investment and 
distribution theories. A critical addition to this classical framework is the Keynesian 
extension, which sets capacity for the system with the principle of effective demand. 
Multiple authors have developed foundations for a classical-Keynesian, or Sraffian-
Keynesian, approach, and have pointed toward the space left open for institutional, 
cultural, and historical detail, but no development has yet filled this “space” with the 
Institutionalism proposed here. 
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